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Abstract
Africa has the dubious distinction of being the continent most likely to experience
the worst climate change has to offer while having the population most vulnerable to its
effects. Many of the continent’s sub regions and countries also have recent histories of
violence or are currently mired in conflict. Africa’s proneness to conflict and its
vulnerability to climate change provide the best model for showing how climate change,
by the way it interacts with other, better understood drivers of conflict, will likely become
an important source of conflict within the region and around the world over the rest of
this century.
This paper’s aim was to identify some possible causal pathways by which the
effects of climate change might be linked to the outbreak of conflict. To achieve this, this
paper sought to answer five main questions: 1) why do conflicts occur when and where
they do? 2) How might climate change impact human societies in Africa? 3) Can those
impacts lead directly to conflict occurrence, or 4) might they instead act indirectly,
through other, more central drivers of conflict? 5) Should there be a climate-conflict
relationship, can we build a model to identify potential future conflict ‘hotspots’ in Africa
or around the world? By providing some answers to these questions, we were able to
identify several possible climate-conflict pathways. We found that the economic impacts
ii	
  
	
  

of climate change, particularly on a country’s agricultural sector and economy through
direct disaster related damage do provide a realistic pathway to conflict in vulnerable
countries as peoples’ livelihoods are negatively impacted, the impacts are not equally
shared among all ethnic groups, and the state itself may not be able to correct such
imbalances.
The economic impact of climate change coupled with its negative impact on food
and water security may also drive increased levels of migration, and with the movement
of large numbers of people comes a greater probability of conflict. The impacts of
climate change may also weaken states to the point that they can no longer provide basic
services demanding by its population, leading to a loss of legitimacy and potentially the
rise of rebellion. The pace of climate change can also affect the likelihood of conflict
occurrence with more rapid pace developments and disasters being more likely to cause
conflict due to less possibility of successful adaptation. In each pathway, climate change
acts as a threat multiplier, acting through other sociopolitical, economic, democratic,
security and systemic drivers to increase the likelihood of conflict, rather than driving
conflict outright.
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Introduction
To an outsider, the outbreak of violence within or between communities might
appear to have come from nowhere; one minute, people are living together peacefully,
the next, they are at each others’ throats. It is as if someone had turned a dial from
‘peace’ to ‘conflict.’ But talk to the people involved, ask them why they fight, and you
will find that the outbreak of violence was neither spontaneous nor random. Instead, the
people will likely point to a long list of grievances against and transgressions by an
opposing party that often stretch back generations. Such lists are used by combatants to
rationalize their actions and to mobilize more people to their cause, but the existence of
grievances, transgressions, and even deep-rooted animosities cannot, in and of
themselves, explain why conflict occurs when and where it does, as there are many
examples of societies wracked by group grievances where violent conflict fails to
manifest. And there are many societies that, while having suffered violent conflict in the
past have managed to remain peaceful for decades or even centuries afterwards. Group
grievances, therefore, are only part of a complex and tangled web of factors that can turn
our hypothetical dial to conflict.
Underlying every conflict, violent or nonviolent, large or small, are a number of
driving factors (drivers) that can influence, if not outright determine, the who (actors),
what (type of conflict and intensity), where (territory affected), when (timing and
1	
  
	
  

duration), why (reasons), and how (mobilization and resources) of conflict occurrence.
Thus, the key to understanding, halting and even preventing violent conflict is to identify
the primary drivers involved, to map the causal pathways leading from each driver to
conflict and to establish the basic ‘who what here when and why’ of the given situation.
But such identification and mapping is rather difficult, as the drivers and pathways tend
to be complex, indirect, interdependent, and case-specific in nature. It should come as
little surprise then despite the vast amount of scholarship and research devoted to the
task, that there remains a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement over the reasons why
conflicts occur when and where they do.
Conflict researchers use a number of different qualitative and quantitative
approaches to identify the drivers of conflict, and to date have found a whole host of
demographic, economic, security, sociopolitical and systemic drivers that may or may not
be behind the world’s violent conflicts. Despite these efforts, the exact relationship
between many drivers and violent conflict remains rather murky. Murkiest of all is the
relationship between environmental change and conflict. This shortfall is unfortunate as it
is becoming clear our changing climate poses a grave challenge to the wellbeing and
development of communities, societies, and countries around the world. Given that, as we
will see, there are a number of compelling arguments as to why environmental changes
and climate change in particular, may increase the possibility of violent conflict, it seems
important to clear away the remaining murk.
The possibility of more frequent and more damaging weather related disasters,
increasing food and water scarcities, and growing floods of environmental migrants and
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refugees in the future is very real, and may be here already, though it is impossible to tell
whether specific events are being driving by climate change or are ‘natural’ events.1 Such
impacts can strain the resources of even the strongest states; therefore, it is imperative to
tease-out any causal pathways that may exist between climate change and the outbreak of
violent conflict. By doing so, we can better identify leverage points for future
interventions to reduce the possibility of conflict should the international community’s
attempts to mitigate serious climate change fail—which appears all too likely. Our ability
to find these leverage points hinges on our ability to answer several important questions:
first, what does the existing literature say about why conflicts occur when and where they
do (generally)? Second, how might the effects of climate change impact human societies,
particularly those seen as most vulnerable today? Third, could those impacts lead directly
to violent conflict? Or, might they instead act as indirect drivers, acting through more
direct drivers of conflict? Finally, can we model the climate-conflict relationship so that
we can identify potential ‘hotspots’ for future conflicts around the world?
The African continent is one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world (see
Section 1.2 and Section 1.3) and is widely believed to be the region most susceptible to
the effects of climate change (see Section 3.2) due to its ecological fragility, the low
levels of human development across much of the continent, the number of fragile and
weak states it contains, and the size, growth and distribution of its population. Africa,
based on recent climate forecasts, is also expected to endure some of the more extreme
climate changes in the world (outside the poles) over the rest of this century—together,
1

The extent to which global climate change has been or is affecting our weather remains
controversial
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these characteristics make Africa the best place to start in our attempt to answer the
questions posed above. Alongside a more theoretical and general approach to identifying
and mapping the drivers of conflict and the linkages between climate change and conflict,
this paper will also look at current and past conflict trends in Africa, examine the reasons
behind the continent’s greater vulnerability to climate change and the likely
consequences it will have on human societies throughout the region, and whether these
consequences could spark new conflicts or reignite dormant ones.
Section one of this paper looks at how conflicts are defined and measured, and
reviews recent and historical conflict trends around the world and in Africa in particular.
Section two provides a framework for understanding the causes of conflict and details the
causes of conflict field’s current understanding of conflict drivers. The third section
underscores Africa’s vulnerabilities to climate change, the current climate forecasts for
the continent’s regions, and their implications for African societies. Section four contains
the central analysis of this paper; it seeks to identify the linkages, both direct and indirect,
between climate change and conflict. Sections Five and Six then use these findings to
construct a conceptual model for forecasting climate related conflicts and makes the case
for establishing a climate-conflict early warning system so that more targeted adaptive
measures might be taken to forestall climate-related conflicts—or at the least, to ease
climate-driven hardship.
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Section 1: Background
What do we mean by the term ‘conflict’? How are conflicts measured? How
many conflicts have there been in recent years? What has been their distribution, both in
terms of time and space? Section 1.1 overviews the definitions of conflict most often
used in causes of conflict analysis. Section 1.2 describes conflict trends around the world
from 1946 to 2010, while section 1.3 looks at conflict trends in Africa only, from the end
of the Cold War to today (1990-2010).

Section 1.1 Giving a Name to Conflict
Analyzing trends in conflict occurrence and duration is an essential first step in
any attempt to identify the general underlying factors that may drive conflict. By such
analysis, one should be able to find common drivers even among very different seeming
conflicts. A number of organizations now track global and regional conflict trends. The
reports they produce identify the actors involved and their goals (if known), the intensity
of the conflict, and how the conflict has evolved over time. This provides vast data sets
for those interested in studying the causes of conflict, but such reports and associated data
also raise the seemingly simple question of what one means by the term ‘conflict’. How
do we define and measure it? Are nonviolent conflicts included? Or is only organized,
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systematic violence considered a conflict? Do we measure conflicts by the number of
deaths incurred? The economic toll inflicted? And how do we distinguish one type of
conflict from another? These are all important questions for understanding the causes of
conflict, as the methodology(s) and definition(s) used to answer them will color any
patterns found.
The most widely used definition of intrastate conflict comes from the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program. Uppsala researchers define armed conflict as a contested
incompatibility or disagreement over the form of government or control over territory
where armed force occurs between at least two parties—one of which must be a state
government, and one a non-state entity—that causes at least 25 battle related deaths in a
year. To be considered an interstate conflict, the fighting must involve at least two state
actors.2 While this definition seems to have become the field standard, it does have some
major limitations. It does not include massacres and genocides because the victims of the
violence are unarmed and unorganized (usually), nor communal riots and pogroms, as
there is no government involvement (at least not direct involvement).
While many causes of conflict researchers use the Uppsala definition verbatim,
others take it as a starting point for building their own definitions. Wallensteen and
Sollenberg, for example, add a severity ranking to their definition, where minor armed
conflicts are those that result in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (BRDPY) but
less than 1,000 total deaths over the course of the entire conflict. Intermediate armed
conflicts are those with BRDPYs of more than 25 but less than 1,000 and that result in at
2

L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009,” Journal of Peace
Research 47, no. 4 (2010): 501-509.
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least 1,000 deaths over the lifespan of the conflict. War includes those conflicts with
BRDPYs over 1,000. Together, intermediate armed conflict and war form the category
major armed conflict.3 Eldadawi and Sambanis define civil war as a violent conflict
resulting in more than 1,000 total deaths where an organized non-state actor challenges
the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, where the fighting takes place
within the state’s territory and where the combatants were concerned with having to live
together after the conflict is over, i.e. must be a non-secessionist conflict.4 This last
criterion may not be very helpful, as it would seem the aim of many civil wars is to
secede from the current political unit rather than remain within it. Separating civil wars
and wars of independence may be splitting hairs a little too finely. Byman and Van Evera
also use the thousand-death threshold, but add the condition that the combatant parties
must be geographically contiguous in order to exclude colonial wars.5
These definitions of conflict all tend to be rather precise in their requirements, and
therefore limit the types of conflict included. The definition used by the Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research (HIICR), on the other hand, is much broader,
and includes non-violent as well as violent incidents and drops the requirement that state
actors be directly involved. The HIICR defines conflict as a clash of some duration and
magnitude between two or more parties with ideational and positional differences over

3

Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict, 1989-2000,” Journal of
Peace Research 38, no. 5 (2001): 629 -644.
4
I. Elbadawi and N. Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See? Estimating the
Prevalence of Civil War in 161 Countries, 1960-1999,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
46, no. 3 (2002): 307–334.
5
D. Byman and S. Van Evera, “Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of
Contemporary Deadly Conflict,” Security Studies 7, no. 3 (1998): 1–50.
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national values and that are determined to pursue their own goals. To organize their
conflicts, the HIICR uses a five-point intensity scale where conflicts of intensity 1 to 2
represent non-violent conflicts (latent and manifest), 3 through 5 violent conflicts (crisis,
severe crisis, and war respectively). Latent conflicts are those where a party has made
demands for change and an opposing party at least takes those demands as serious;
manifest conflicts are those situations which may be on the verge of violence, includes:
intergroup pressure, threats of violence, economic sanctions, boycotts, etc. A crisis
occurs when armed force is used in a sporadic fashion by at least one party; a crisis
becomes severe if force is used repeatedly and in an organized way; war is a violent
conflict in which force is used with a certain continuity and in an organized and
systematic way, where the extent of destruction and loss of life is massive and of long
duration.6 As opposed to earlier definitions, HIICR’s may be overly broad, and certainly
raises some questions about how one might measure these criteria—but the HIICR is
careful to provide a detailed description of their methodology.
Other organizations, like USAID, eschew any set definition of conflict and avoid
identifying conflict typologies due to the complex nature of conflicts in general,
preferring to focus on the underlying causes of conflicts in general, regardless of conflict
severity7—after all, conflict prevention relies on early detection of conflict generating
conditions and it is hard to know how a conflict will evolve once it begins.

6

HIICR, Conflict Barometer 2009, Annual Flagship Report, Conflict Barometer
(University of Heidelberg: Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research,
2009).
7
USAID, Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program
Development, Conflict Management and Mitigation (Washington, DC: USAID, 2005).
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Section 1.2 A History of Violence Around the World
Total Number of Conflicts Around the World, by year and by study
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Given the various definitions of conflict currently in use, the organizations and
researchers that provide comprehensive accountings of modern conflicts tend to produce
different numbers when it comes to the total number of conflicts recorded over a given
period of time and in a given region. Therefore, this section will provide a summary of
historical and recent trends in conflict occurrence, nature, and duration rather than
detailing the exact number of conflicts year to year, though section 1.3 on conflict in
Africa will provide a more detailed look at conflict trends within Africa.
Several major trends dominate the conflict record from 1946 to 2009. The first is
the impact of the ending of the Cold War both on the number of conflicts and the type of
conflicts experienced. The second trend is a growing regional concentration of conflicts,
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with the bulk of conflicts increasingly limited to certain regions of the world. The third
trend is that conflicts are becoming increasingly complex, as more recent conflicts have
come to include more than two actors, and a final trend is the rising number of conflict
reoccurrences as opposed to new conflict outbreaks.
From 1946 to 1992, the number of violent conflicts worldwide increased steadily,
reaching an all time high in 1992. But after 1992, with the shockwaves of the Soviet
Union’s collapse beginning to dissipate, the number of conflicts underwent a sharp
decline. But the drop in the overall number of conflicts appears to have bottomed out by
the early 2000s. In 2003, the number of conflicts began to rise again, and by 2009, the
number of active conflicts had increased by 24% over the 1992-2003 trough.8 Along with
a general decline in the number of conflicts after 1992, the post Cold War period also saw
a shift in the type and intensity of the new conflicts that occurred. Before 1992, interstate
conflicts were the dominant form of conflict around the world, with colonial wars for
independence being the most common and deadliest form of interstate conflict9 between
1946 and 1961.10
As the Cold War and the wars for independence came to an end, intrastate
conflicts gradually become the norm. These conflicts tended to have much smaller death
tolls than interstate conflicts, but they also had a disproportionate impact on civilians11.

8

Harbom and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009.”
Counted either as interstate or extrastate
10
Human Security Center, Human Security Brief 2006, Annual Flagship Report, Human
Secuirty Brief (University of British Columbia: Human Security Center, 2006).
11
According to Marshall and Cole (2009) the magnitude of conflict in terms of lives lost
and economic losses incurred decreased by 60% since peaking in the 1980s, reaching the
lowest levels since 1960 in 2009. M. G Marshall and B. R Cole, Global Report 2009:
10	
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Interestingly, the intensity (in terms of lives lost) of one-sided violence like acts of
genocide, massacres, and pogroms reached its lowest level since 1989 during the 2005 to
2008 period, after undergoing a major surge from 1993 to 1998.12
The shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts coincided with a greater regional
concentration of conflict. Africa and Asia have accounted for the majority of conflicts
around the world, especially after the 1960s, and continue to remain the regions most
affected by conflict today. Africa, by itself, accounts for far and away the majority of
non-state conflicts, with the number of conflicts on the continent peaking in 1992 to
1993, and again in 2000 to 2003. Asia endured the second highest number of conflicts,
though from 2001 to 2005, Latin America was a very close third; after 2005, Asia’s lead
widened significantly.
Along with greater regional concentration, the shift to intrastate conflict also
coincided with an increase in conflict complexity. In the 1970s, only 10% of all recorded
conflicts involved more than two actors (or multiple dyads), with the majority of conflicts
consisting of state versus state or state versus a single armed rebel faction. By 2003, over
30% of all conflicts were fought between multiple rebel factions and states, with some
conflicts involving four or more distinct rebel movements.13 The growth in multiple dyad
conflicts and in overall conflict duration during the 1980s can probably be linked to third

Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility (George Mason University: Center for
Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy, 2009).
12
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Definition of Armed Conflict - Uppsala University,”
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, n.d.,
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/ (accessed
July 24, 2011).
13
Harbom and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009.”
11	
  
	
  

party intervention (i.e. the US and USSSR) via funding, arming and training rebel
factions. Post Cold War, however, increasing conflict complexity would seem to go hand
in hand with the growing number of fragile and weak states around the world, and the
proliferation of small arms.14
Complex conflicts tend to be harder to resolve than more straightforward ‘one-onone’ conflicts. They also tend to not stay ‘resolved’. From 2000 to 2010, the majority of
conflict occurrences were actually reoccurrences of earlier conflicts (a reported ratio of 5
to 1), and of the conflicts that have ended since 2000, 2/3rds were also conflict
reoccurrences.15

14

See Section 2
J Hewitt, Ted Gurr, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Peace and Conflict 2010: Executive
Summary (University of Maryland: Paradigm Publishing, 2010).
12	
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Section 1.3 A History of Violence in Africa
Total Number of Conflicts in Africa, by year and by study
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Conflict trends in Africa largely mirrored global trends over the last half-century,
with the continent seeing increasing numbers of conflicts throughout the 1950 to 1990
period, as the process of decolonization and the Cold War shaped the Africa’s
geopolitical landscape. During the end of colonial period and early Cold War, nearly onefourth of all countries in Africa were affected by conflict (not counting wars for
independence). By the late Cold War in the 1980s, more than half of all countries were
currently or had recently been affected by conflict16, and many of those had multiple
conflicts going on at once. As with most regions of the globe, conflict in Africa reached
16

S. Fukuda-Parr et al., “The Conflict-Development Nexus: A Survey of Armed Conflicts
in Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005,” Journal of Peacebuliding and Development 4, no. 1
(2008): 1–16.
13	
  
	
  

its peak in terms of both numbers and lives lost in 1992 and 1993, and saw some declines
in overall numbers after 2004.17 Like the rest of the globe, the general trend has been
away from interstate to intrastate conflict, though true interstate conflicts were never very
common in Africa as compared to most other regions. Of the 126 different conflicts
recorded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, all but six were armed intrastate
conflicts.18 And unlike most other regions, a number of countries in Africa have actually
expanded their cross-border military activities, though whether this will mean a rise in
interstate conflict is unclear. Conflicts in Africa tend to be particularly complex and long
lasting. Many countries have been host to multiple independent conflicts at once, and
many conflicts have spilled over into regional wars (the Great Lakes, Southern Africa,
Mano River Basin and Central East Africa)19 as rebel groups and state-actors not only
crossed national borders but established themselves outside their home state.

17

Monty Marshall, Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004 a Macro-Comparative Analysis,
Report prep. for Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) (Arlington, VA; London:
Center for Systemic Peace; Department for International Development, 2006).
18
Fukuda-Parr et al., “The Conflict-Development Nexus.”
19
Ibid
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Section 2: Why Do Conflicts Occur When and Where They Do?
Conflicts are historical, dynamic, and multi-dimensional, they have multiple causes and
consequences of which a number are unexpected and unintended. They also involve a
multitude of actors and have to be approached from different levels of analysis and
intervention.20
The introduction to this paper talked about the importance and difficulty of
answering the ‘who what where how and when’ of conflict occurrence in order to halt or
prevent violent conflict. This section attempts to provide some answers to these
questions, while keeping in mind the cautionary quote above. The 5 Ws and 1 H
themselves suggest the best place to start our analysis: a conceptual framework where
each interrogative represents certain factors that either give rise to conflict or governs
how conflicts evolve. This broad framework will make the identification of individual
conflict drivers much easier. The framework described below is made up of a synthesis of
existing conflict frameworks and causes of conflict analysis. Six factors are used:
structural, mobilizing, actors, triggers, catalysts, and dampeners. Each is described in
detail below.

20

P. Douma, G. Frerks, and L. Van de Goor, Causes of Conflict in the Third World:
Synthesis Report (The Hauge, 1998), vii.
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Section 2.1 A Conflict Framework
Conflict Elements Diagram

Figure 2.1

Source: Author’s conception

Structural factors are the ‘why’ of conflict occurrence. They encompass a broad
range of elements that in certain configurations create an environment conducive to
conflict by giving rise to societal divisions and grievances. At their most general,
structural factors are the characteristics of the systems in which we live: the culture,
society, domestic and international political systems, and the natural environment. More
often than not, we hardly notice the presence or effects of specific elements; it is only
when these elements have a negative effect on our lives or livelihoods that they come to
our attention—and, as we will see, declines in livelihoods can easily become a source of
grievance for those affected towards the actor(s) and or system(s) seen to be responsible.
Structural factors operate on many levels, from the local to the international, which
together can create a complex web of interactions. Given the wide range of possible
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structural factors, our primary focus here will be on those intra-national and international
structures that tend to generate horizontal inequalities—social, political, and or economic
inequalities between defined groups within a society rather than between income levels.21
The structural factors examined in this paper are organized into five categories:
demographic, economic, sociopolitical, security, and systemic/other, each of which
contains a number of individual conflict drivers.
Mobilizing factors represent a crossing over from the ‘why’ to the ‘who.’
Mobilizing factors address the question of why certain groups, when faced with
divisionary structural factors become receptive to calls for violence as a means of solving
their issues while other groups do not. There are two main types of mobilizing factors:
ideational and organizational. Ideational factors are the set of beliefs, grievances, and
greed held by an individual or group that together can make that individual or group more
likely to engage in violent conflict. Ideational factors tend to be the direct result of
structurally generated inequalities. But just because one group may harbor a strong
dislike or even hatred for another, even if the group feels worse off than another, that
doesn’t mean violence is the automatic outcome. Such groups still require mobilization.
Organizational factors are the resources and opportunities required to mobilize
the masses. To undertake a campaign of sustained violence, a group must be able to
mobilize both human and financial resources. The need for financial resources is obvious,
21

The notion of horizontal inequalities has largely been developed in D. Smith, “Trends
and Causes of Armed Conflict,” in The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.
(Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003). and F.
Stewart, D. Holdstock, and A. Jarquin, “Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing
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as any would-be rebel or militant group has to be able to acquire weapons and pay its
fighters. Human resources, in this conception, come in two main types: the young men
and boys that represent a group’s recruitment pool, and the political entrepreneurs who
exploit existing social cleavages in order to stir up resentment and violence between
groups. Political entrepreneurs can both touch off a conflict and act as a catalyst (see
below) by their tendency to become highly visible figureheads for one side or another,
enhancing that side’s ability to gather funding and recruits.22
The term mobilization strategy, as used in the literature, concerns this ability of
political entrepreneurs to frame structural factors in such a way as to further their own
interests. Mobilization strategies also capture the ways in which groups themselves frame
and understand structural factors, whether they see it as worth taking up arms or whether
they might seek a more peaceful form of redress. Organizational opportunities
meanwhile, are factors whose presence enhances the viability of the ‘conflict option’
while also potentially widening a conflict once it has begun. Example organizational
opportunities include the presence of valuable and easily lootable natural resources, illicit
drug production sites or distribution pathways, and a lack of security provision from the
central government.23
Actors represent the parties who drive conflict and suffer from it. Identifying all
the potential actors in a conflict can be a daunting task. It requires identifying and
analyzing the interests (goals, hopes, fears), relations, and capacities of local, national
and international groups already involved or that may become involved as the conflict
22
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evolves. A given conflict may concern everyone from local tribal groups, to neighboring
states, and even the United Nations.
Triggers are singular events or sudden shocks to a society or state that disrupt
established structures, systems, and power relationships by enhancing uncertainty and
inequality, and by weakening state capacity to respond to further shocks. Together these
effects can push already aggrieved groups into violence, in other words, triggers make
violent conflict a more attractive option than it was prior to the event. A triggering event,
by itself, cannot explain the underlying reasons for a conflict, but it can explain why a
conflict occurred at that particular moment and in that particular place. Triggers are
therefore an essential part of conflict formation; they are the ‘when’ of conflict
occurrence, they are what turn the proverbial dial from ‘peace’ to ‘conflict.’
Unfortunately, triggers are also the hardest factor for those who wish to prevent
conflict to prepare for. Triggering factors go by a number of names in the literature:
windows of opportunity, proximate reasons, dynamics, etc.24 A natural disaster, an
economic downturn, the assassination of a prominent politician, a looming election or the
release of election results can all act as conflict triggers in certain situations.
Catalysts are a part of the dynamic nature of conflict. They are escalatory factors
that can enhance a conflict’s intensity or size. Most often, catalysts come in the form of
actions taken by the conflicting parties themselves that either intensify the conflict or
make it that much harder to resolve. In intrastate conflicts where the state is involved, the
24
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most common catalyst tends to be the overly heavy or otherwise botched response of the
government to a new-formed conflict. A government’s failure to address a triggering
event can also cause a nascent conflict to intensify. Also, the longer the conflict, the
greater the chance that new catalysts come into play, creating a positive feedback loop,
forcing the conflict ever larger. Examples of ‘new’ catalysts include: the development of
a war economy and greater arms trade, increased human rights abuses, and the formation
of radical or paramilitary groups, etc.25
Dampeners are those factors whose presence could help bring the parties to a
conflict to the negotiating table, or at least to deescalate from current levels of violence.
Dampening factors include peace-building interventions from third parties, the mutual
exhaustion of the parties involved (a hurting stalemate), or the loss of funding and or
political backing by an outside party. But perhaps the most important dampening factor is
a state’s ability to maintain peace and stability inside its borders. A state’s capacity is
most often expressed in terms of security and especially human security. The question
here is whether existing political, military, and economic institutions are able to remedy
the factors driving the unrest—assuming they themselves are not completely
responsible—if they can provide remedy, then it is a good chance the state itself can act
as a dampener, but if it cannot or does not, its failure to do so may instead become a
catalyst for further conflict.
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Section 2.2: Identifying the Causes of Conflict
There are very few necessary conditions for war and very many sufficient conditions of
which only a few of these may apply at a time.26
As the above conflict framework illustrates, violent conflicts tend to arise from a
complex web of structural, mobilizing, and triggering factors whose linkages may not be
readily apparent and may on the surface even appear contradictory. This can make
identifying potential conflict ‘hotspots’ difficult. It can also make discerning the
influence of non-standard factors like climate change on the array of preexisting drivers
an even greater challenge. Therefore, the next step in addressing these challenges is to
build a discreet set of the ‘most significant’ conflict drivers—also no easy task given the
amount of disagreement that remains over just which the most important drivers might
be—using the conceptual framework outlined above as a means of organization. The set
of conflict drivers described in this paper are those most frequently cited as important in
the causes of conflict literature. In general, the most frequently cited drivers all fall into
the structural factors portion of the framework, which makes sense, as structural factors
are the most easily quantified and measured of conflict components, as opposed to, say,
ideational factors. The conflict drivers described below are grouped into four main
categories: demographic, economic, sociopolitical, security. Each entry below includes a
brief summary of the driver’s role (as best understood and keeping in mind the complex
and overlapping nature of most drivers) in conflict formation as well as a list of authors
who cite it in their studies.

26

	
  

Smith, “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” 5.
21	
  

Section 2.2.a: Demographic Drivers
People are at the heart of any conflict, whether they are combatants or civilians
caught in the middle. Thus, it would stand to reason that a society’s demographic
characteristics would be important and straightforward drivers of conflict. Demographic
drivers include the primary characteristics of a given population: its size, distribution,
density, rate of growth, and age and sex structures, as well as secondary characteristic
like ethnic and religious diversity. Together, these characteristics should not only be
important drivers of conflict, they should be essential in determining which groups might
turn to violent solutions. That’s how demographic drivers ought to behave, in reality,
however, their exact role isn’t so clear.

Population Size, Density, and Growth Rate: Nearly every study finds a strong
correlation between the number of people living in a country and the probability of
violent conflict: the more people, the greater risk of conflict occurrence. The effect of
population density is slightly less clear. Most studies find density to be positively
associated with conflict occurrence, but to a lesser degree than overall population size.
Interestingly, the distribution of population densities may play a role. Countries with only
a few areas of high density and a majority of rural areas may actually see less chance of
conflict occur, whereas countries with more evenly distributed population densities may
see a greater risk.27
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Ethnicity: As Wimmer et al (2009) describe it, there are three standard schools of
thought when it comes to the role of ethnic and religious diversity in driving conflict: the
greed-and-opportunity school, the diversity-breeds-conflict school, and the minority
mobilization school of thought. In the greed-opportunity-school, ethnic diversity is seen
as an insignificant driver as the number of ethnicity related grievances around the world
greatly outweigh the number of conflicts that do occur. More important than ethnicity,
under this view, is the presence of a weak government and lootable goods that together
allow for ethnic based mobilization that would otherwise have been tamped down. The
diversity-breeds-conflict school holds that there is a direct connection between the level
of ethnic diversity within a country and the probability of violent conflict, with higher
levels of diversity making conflict more likely. The minority-mobilization school holds
that ethnicity only matters under certain situations of minority discrimination and
exclusion. Wimmer et al make the argument that all three schools fail to adequately
address the role of the state in creating ethnic conflicts—rather than a high degree of
diversity, it is the exclusion of ethnic groups from state power and group competition for
state resources that drive conflict.28
In general, most analysts have found that whether ethnic diversity actually
becomes a driver of conflict depends on the amount of the diversity within the state,
region, or community. Like other inverted-u drivers (regime type), ethnic diversity
becomes a driver of conflict in ‘middle situations. I.e. the most conflict prone situation
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occurs when a population includes a large majority ethnic group plus a sizable minority
ethnic group; situations where the majority can’t wholly dominate the minority and the
minority can’t overwhelm the majority. In highly diverse populations, on the other hand,
no one ethnic group can dominate the others and there are plenty of groups to check the
ambitions of other ethnic groups. In highly homogenous populations, ethnicity, as a
conflict driver, naturally tends to fall by the wayside. The question is, what is the
‘amount’ of diversity needed for ethnicity to become a driver? Collier finds that the risk
of conflict occurrence doubles when the majority group comprises between 45 to 90% of
the population and the largest minority group makes up between 10 and 15%.29 Gurr et al
find that large countries with medium to high levels of diversity are five to eight times
more likely to experience conflict than smaller or more homogenous countries, but they
do not provide specific quantification.30

Migration: The movement of peoples from one area to another has long been seen as a
source of conflict as the arrival of new peoples to an area can disrupt established social
and political systems. The arrival of migrants can also breed mistrust and ethnic division
when the distribution of resources and power is at stake. Migration can also lead to the
rise of Diaspora groups in other countries. Depending on size and economic clout, such
groups can and have provided funding for parties involved in the conflict back home,
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most often rebel groups.31 A number of push-pull factors go into determining when
people move. Push factors are those economic, social, environmental and security factors
present in a person’s home country or region which may at least plant the seed for
migration. Pull factors are present when conditions in a neighboring region or country
are, or at least conceived, to be better than they are at home. Generally, both push and
pull factors need to be present before people move.32 The exception to this is what is
known as forced migration, where conditions in a person’s home region or country are
such that his or her life is in immediate danger.

Age and Sex Structure: A youth bulge occurs when young people between the ages of
15 and 29 make up a sizeable portion of a country’s total population (usually pegged at
40% or more). Countries undergoing a youth bulge seem to be at greater risk for conflict
than countries lacking such a demographic feature, one estimate suggests that youth
bulge effected countries are 2.3 times more likely to experience conflict over a given time
period than those countries without.33 Recently, there is growing evidence that youth
bulges tend to affect the intensity of conflict rather than the probability of conflict
occurrence, with the greatest impact being on low intensity conflicts.34 This makes sense
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as the presence of a youth bulge means that the various sides to a conflict have a larger
recruitment base (cannon fodder) to draw from. Most countries have experienced youth
bulges as they undergo the demographic transition towards becoming developed, as lifes
pans increase but birthrates remain high.35 Ateem finds that countries undergoing this
transition tend to be 2.5 times more likely to experience civil war than other countries as,
most often, economic growth is unable to keep up with the demand for jobs.36
The general conclusion by a number of analysts as regards demographic drivers of
conflict seems to be that democratic characteristics, while important, tend to only become
conflict drivers when certain economic and sociopolitical conditions are present; they
build off of other structural drivers instead of being a source of conflict themselves37.

Section 2.2.b: Economic Drivers
Economic drivers encompass the structure and dynamics of a country’s economy,
as well as the material wellbeing of its population. Economic drivers are widely seen as
the most important drivers of conflict,38 as they are thought to underlie most types of
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conflict, especially ethnic and secessionist conflicts, given their tendency to generate
intergroup grievances and competition. The existing literature on the economic causes of
conflict—perhaps the most extensive of any driver category—provides some of the most
straightforward relationships between driver and conflict, and as we will see in section
four, they may also provide the key to establishing a link between climate change and
conflict.

GDP and GDP Per Capita: high-income countries are less likely to experience conflict,
all other things being equal. This relationship is perhaps the most widely accepted of any
relationship of driver to conflict in this section. Researchers from Collier (2004) to
Piccitto (2010) and Dixon (2009) have all found a very robust correlation between a
state’s income level and the level of violence it is likely to experience within its
borders.39 Piccitto, for example, found that states with a per capita GDP of US$1,000 or
less were 3 times more likely to experience conflict than those with per capita GDPs of
US$4,000 or more.

Over Dependence on Natural Resources or Agriculture: States with economies
largely based on a single or on a few select resources like timber, oil, ores, and
agricultural produce, tend to be overly vulnerable to price and trade shocks, which can
39
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generate group resentments as economic shocks are more likely to affect certain segments
of society—those lacking a financial cushion or other options for earning a livelihood—
than others. But group grievances can also arise from such economic dependence even
during the good times whenever the wealth generated by natural resources or produce are
unequally distributed between groups, or whenever the extractive process used to obtain
the resources produces localized pollution or forces the relocation of local populations40.
Dependence on natural resources and or agricultural production is most often measured
by the percent of a country’s GDP coming from primary commodity exports. Collier
found that countries where 26% or more of their GDP comes from primary commodity
exports are 23% more likely to experience conflict all other factors being equal. He
argues that a country’s reliance on easily lootable goods opens it up to the possibility of
predatory (greed-based) rebellions.41

Economic downturns/poor growth/under development A weakening economy can be
a major driver of conflict as slowdowns narrow the peaceful (and lawful) options for an
individual to earn a livelihood. A ‘shrinking pie’ can also lead to elite competition for
control over dwindling economic resources. Both of these outcomes can lead to conflict
and each can also serve to reinforce the other.42 Ethnic violence and anti-immigrant
sentiments often accompany economic downturns when once well established groups
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begin to see a decline in their livelihoods or prospects;43 such a decline can be relative or
absolute, but relative declines would seem to be the most conducive to creating the
conditions for ethnic based violence (see horizontal inequality below). Piccitto (2010)
points out that during the period from 1980-2000, one third of the least developed
countries were embroiled in intrastate and or interstate conflicts, and that of the 20
countries in 2002 ranked lowest in terms of the Human Development Index, 16 were
currently in or had just emerged from violent conflict. Countries experiencing positive
economic growth were 50% less likely to experience conflict than countries undergoing
an economic contraction, as rapid economic growth raises the opportunity costs for
would be fighters to join a rebellion.44

Section 2.2.c Security Drivers
Security drivers are those factors that can affect the ability of a state to maintain a sense
of order within its boundaries. They also represent the opportunities, or lack there of, for
rebel groups to challenge the existing system(s).

History of Violence: the single greatest security-based driver of conflict (and most cited)
is whether the state or society in question has experienced violent conflict in the recent
past. Stewart (2002) finds that countries with a history of prior conflict are 40 to 50%
more likely to experience either a new conflict outbreak or a reoccurrence of the old
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conflict45. The most obvious consequence of a country having endured a recent conflict is
conflict reoccurrence, when one or more parties to the conflict decide that the postconflict situation is not to their liking. But a history of violence can also lead to new
conflicts: if the structural factors that lead to the initial conflict remain unaddressed, the
chances are greater that a new conflict may emerge The recent conflict could also make
mobilizing groups for new violence easier as the past conflict likely generated new
grievances over its lifetime.46 Finally, the prior conflict likely had an adverse impact on
the country’s national economy and personal income,47 which, as we’ve seen, can pave
the way for new conflicts.

Rebel Opportunities: Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that wars are driven by military
opportunity rather than questions of political legitimacy.48 If this is true, then the
existence of such opportunities may be strong drivers or at least indicators of future
conflict. Included in this section is a wide array of factors that can make it harder for a
state to maintain control over its territory and therefore might make it easier for rebel
groups to form. One such factor that appears in many studies is the presence of
mountainous terrain, poor road networks and jungles. Some researchers like Fearon and
Laitin (2003) find that mountainous countries are more likely to experience civil wars

45

Stewart, Holdstock, and Jarquin, “Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing
Countries Commentary.”
46
Ibid., 344.
47
Hegre et al., “Predicting Armed Conflict 2010–2050.”
48
Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”
30	
  
	
  

because of the cover such terrain lends to rebel fighters.49 But other studies find no
evidence of mountainous terrain as an explanatory factor.50 The geographic distribution
of a country’s population may be more important than the particular type of terrain as a
more wide flung populace would naturally be harder to control.51 The level of small arms
available in the country is another potential rebel opportunity as the presence easily
available weapons not only weakens the state’s monopoly of force but also can generally
lower the cost of resistance. Other rebel opportunities include: the presence of valuable
and easily lootable resources which can provide a rebel movement with all the funding
they’d need to challenge the state52—this is covered more under the economic drivers
category, material and monetary support by foreign rebels or other states, and the
presence of cross-border safe havens.53

State Strength and Level of Militarization: The first priority of any (healthy) state is to
provide security for its people, to protect them from potential enemies, both foreign and
domestic, and to keep criminal activity in check. The level of criminal violence in a
country can be a good indicator of the state’s strength; the inability to enforce its own
laws and protect its citizens can also lead to grievances against the state and prompt
various groups to take up arms for their own protection. The level of militarization in a
country has a similar impact as the greater the presence of the state security apparatus, the
49
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more likely some group will become aggrieved or feel insecure, again increasing the
likelihood of conflict rather than suppressing it.54 But this effect goes the other way as
well: if the level of militarization is so low that the state is no longer able to deter nonactors from challenging it or each other, than there will be a similar push by various
groups to provide their own security, again increasing the likelihood of conflict.55

Section 2.2.d: Sociopolitical Drivers
Sociopolitical drivers of conflict encompass a country’s political system and the
nature of relations between the state and its people. Sociopolitical drivers include:
government/regime structure, democratization, weak state capacity, loss of state
legitimacy, and elite intransigence.

Government/regime structure: Current literature exploring the relationship between
government structure and the risk of conflict suggests that there exists an inverted-U
relationship between the nature of a state’s political structure and the likelihood of
conflict. The inverted-u pattern runs from strong democracy on one side to strong
autocracy on the other. Strong democracies and strong autocracies tend to be quite stable
due to their capacity to control their populations. For democracies, control and stability is
maintained through the combination of a monopoly on the use force, and their ability to
become more inclusive or responsive to the demands of its people. For autocracies, it is
54
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the monopoly of force coupled with their ability to ignore or crush dissent. It is when
political systems move towards the middle of the U, either through attempts at
democratization (for autocracies) or repression (for democracies) that the chance of
violent conflict becomes greatest. Anocracies make up the middle of the U.
Anocracies are a transitional state between autocracy and democracy and tend to
be the least stable form of government as any attempt to move from the middle can
trigger conflict. Marshall and Cole, for example, find anocracies to be highly unstable,
with 50% of those studied experiencing a major regime chance within 5 years and 70%
within 10. Over time, anocracies tend to be 6 times more likely to experience conflict
than democracies and at least 2.5 times more likely than autocracies. Anocracies are also
3 times more likely to revert or move to an autocracy that to become a democracy.56

Democratization: Democracies do not fight other democracies. This finding has almost
become a truism in international relations. And while it does appear to be true that an
established, strong democracy is likely to remain at peace both with other democracies
and itself, the process of democratization is not so peace inducing. Indeed,
democratization can be a primary driver of conflict. Byman and van Evera describe three
main ways the democratization process might act as a conflict driver: when the political
elites currently in power undertake violent measures to crush democratic movements in
the hopes of retaining their own power, when minority groups worry that a democratic
system might sideline them, reducing what power or privileges they might currently
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enjoy, and when the democratization process opens the door for secessionist movements
as their regions gain greater autonomy from the political center.57 The DFID study of
conflict trends provides a list of African countries that have experienced violent conflict
triggered by efforts at democratization: the Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo
Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Niger, and Sierra Leone--each of these
countries undertook a program of rapid democratization. Three countries, Burkina Faso,
Djibouti and Tanzania took a much slower approach and remained largely peaceful.58

Loss of State Capacity: A state is considered strong when it has the capacity to both
maintain security within its borders and to provide (at the least) basic services for its
people; such states are unlikely to experience violent intrastate conflict. Stewart describes
state capacity as a social contract: the well functioning state, with its provision of
services and a monopoly on the use of force, creates a favorable environment for
economic advance and social stability, and in turn makes violent options less attractive.
But when a state grows weak, when it is no longer able to uphold its contract and
services lapse, instability and violence become more likely.59 The question, then, is what
causes states to lose capacity? The most likely causes are sudden shocks to the system:
economic downturns that require a large amount of government resources, a surge in food
or energy prices that make subsidizing staple goods impossible, and expensive
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disasters60. In other words, events that strain state resources may result in a long term or
even permanent loss of capacity.

Loss of State Legitimacy: Intrastate conflicts do not occur without reason, and much of
the reason would seem to hinge on whether a state’s citizenry views the apparatus of state
as legitimate. A legitimate state is one that meets the economic, security, and
sociopolitical needs of its people—so long as potentially restive groups feel that they
have a voice in political decision making, have a fair shot at making a decent living and
feel secure, it is unlikely that any rebel group (should one form) will be able to attract
enough of the polity to prove a challenge to the state. Thus, state legitimacy, as Douma et
al point out, is strongly linked to the state’s institutional capacity; as it gains or losses
capacity, it also gains or loses legitimacy.61 The potential for violent conflict comes when
a state begins to lose its legitimacy (assuming it had any to begin with). The causes of
conflict literature identify several ways this can happen: poor economic performance, a
lack of regime accountability, the rise of a restive class, and according to Byrn and Van
Evera, the discrediting of state ideology as with the collapse of the Soviet Union.62 Once
states see their legitimacy begin to erode, it can be difficult to regain it. Should a state
push toward increased democratization, entrenched elites may come to oppose the
broadening of access to power and the possibility of a tyranny of the masses becomes
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greater.63 Should a state instead try to suppress dissent it will likely only strengthen
current grievances through heavy-handed tactics and through continuing to fail at address
the reasons why they lost legitimacy in the first place. A number of researchers have
found the loss of state legitimacy to be one of the most important causes of intrastate
conflict.64
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Section 3: Climate Change and Africa
Section 3.1 Vulnerability and adaptation
Nearly every study of climate change and its anticipated human impacts singles
out Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, as being the most vulnerable region in
the world. For this paper, it is important to understand both what it means to be
vulnerable to climate change and the various factors that make one region more
susceptible than another. The concept of climate vulnerability is best thought of in terms
of a simple equation:
Level of Vulnerability to Climate Change = (exposure + sensitivity) – (resilience
+adaptive capacity)
This equation applies to all levels of analysis, but here we will stick to the societal
level. A society’s level of vulnerability to climate change is equal to the extent to which
the livelihoods of its people depend on natural ecosystems (exposure), plus how much
these ecosystems change for every unit of change in the global system (sensitivity),
minus the structural aspects of the society in question that can dampen (or worsen)
climate vulnerability/effects (resilience) plus the resources the society can draw on to
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address climatic changes or to change its own behavior (adaptive capacity).65

Section 3.2: A Vulnerable Continent
African societies, and developing countries more generally, tend to be more
vulnerable to climactic changes than developed countries because of five widely shared,
vulnerability-generating characteristics: a significant proportion of their economies are
based on environmentally sensitive sectors like agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and
tourism; their ability to adapt to change is limited due to poor institutional and physical
infrastructure; many are already suffering from localized environmental degradation and
water stress; they tend to be located in regions of the world most likely to see severe
climate change; and their populations tend to be particularly clustered in ecologically
fragile areas or areas vulnerable to sea level rise. Nearly every country in Africa has all
five characteristics, making it the best model for studying the impact of climate change
on society and for identifying the linkages between climate and conflict.
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Section 3.2.a: Africa’s Agricultural Dependence
Agriculture, Value Added as a % of GDP
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Agriculture dominates the African economy, both in terms of its overall size and
in the sheer number of livelihoods dependent on it. Estimates are that the agricultural
sector alone represents between 23 and 37% of the continent’s total GDP and accounts
for up to half of the value of the continent’s total exports (40 to 55% of total export
value).66 The sector provides employment for some 65 to 75% of Africa’s total labor
force (in some countries it can be as high as 90%)--exports of fresh fruit and vegetables
to the UK, alone provide some 1 million livelihoods.67
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Despite the sector’s great value, agriculture in Africa remains severely
underdeveloped, with small-scale farmers accounting for more than 90% of all
agricultural production on the continent68. Some 80% of all African cropland is rain-fed,
as opposed to irrigated, meaning that crops are dependent on receiving adequate and
timely rainfall.69 African farmers use the lowest levels of fertilizer of any region,
averaging 9 kilograms of fertilizer per hectare of land as compared to a global average of
101 kg/ha,70 and its farms continue to see high levels of post-harvest crop loss (averaging
10-20% loss for Maize, 25% for all cereals, and as much as 50% for fruits and
vegetables)71 due to poor infrastructure. Overall agricultural production in Africa has
indeed increased, tripling over the last 50 years, but at the same time (1969-2005), caloric
consumption in SSA increased by only 3% and since 2005 has undergone major declines.
East Asia, during the same period, saw caloric intake increase by 41%.72 Because of rapid
population growth, per capita food production today is roughly equivalent to the 1960
level.73
Agriculture in Africa is also severely dependent on favorable weather conditions.
Along with being primarily rain-fed, many African crops are already grown at the edge of
their heat tolerance, so that even a few unusually hot days can have a major impact on
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crop yields due to water-loss and decreased fertility.74 Maize, sorghum, millet and
groundnut—staple produce across much of Africa—yields are already subject to
climactic fluctuations like El Nino. During strong El Nino periods, these crops can see a
20-50% drop in yields across southern Africa.75 Recent climate change forecasts see
southern Africa’s climate moving towards more El Nino-like conditions, on a permanent
basis.76 Making matters worse, maize, a water-hungry and drought susceptible crop, is the
most widely grown of any staple crop across Africa; it is the main food source for some
300 million people.77
Complicating factors is the fact that many of the people employed in the
agricultural sector have few prospects outside the sector and are barely scraping by as it
is. Some 3/4s of Africa’s malnourished children and the majority of people living in
absolute poverty live on small farms.78

Section 3.2.b: Environmental Degradation
Soil erosion, increasing soil salinity, and desertification are already having a
massive impact on food and water security levels across Africa, making affected societies
that much more vulnerable to future changes in climate. Estimates are that, as early as
1990, some 5 million square kilometers of were already considered degraded, including
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65% of all cropland and 40% of pastureland currently in use (a 1993 measurement), as
well as 70% of the continent’s drylands79 as a result of over-cultivation, overgrazing,
deforestation, and mismanagement of irrigated cropland.80 A further 950,000 square
kilometers is threatened with irreversible degradation if current rates of nutrient loss
continue.81 Most of this degradation comes as the result of soil erosion due to
deforestation (13%), poor agricultural practices (37%), and overgrazing (49%).82 SubSaharan Africa has the highest rate of deforestation of any region in the world, losing
40,000 square kilometers or .6% of its forest cover every year (the global average rate is
.18%)—with eastern and southern Africa having the fastest rates of loss.83
Coastal erosion is also proving a major problem as increasing beachfront
development and sand mining has led to erosion rates as high as 30 meters/year in
Western Africa (with Togo and Benin seeing the largest losses).84 Salinization and
desertification are the other main types of land degradation. Current estimates are that
2.7% of Africa’s total land area, about 647,000 square kilometers is affected by
salinization; that’s 26% of all salinized land worldwide. Africa’s drylands, which cover
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43% of its land area are very susceptible to desertification, and in recent decades have
seen an accelerating rate of desertification. Each year, some 3500 square kilometers of
Nigerian land turns to desert.85
Degraded agricultural lands lead without question to reduced crop yields, and
while the exact level of loss depends on very localized conditions, estimates are that crop
loss from soil erosion alone amounts to between 2 and 40% of potential productivity, a
much wider range than the global average of 1 to 8%.86 Such reductions in productivity
have a direct impact on economic growth as crop loss due to land degradation is thought
to amount to 3% of agriculture’s total contribution to GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa. In
Ethiopia, alone, land degradation amounts to a loss of US$130 million each year.87 But
degraded land not only leads to reduced crop yields, it limits the possibility of further
agricultural expansion—something greatly needed in the face of expected population
growth—and negatively impacts water sources as increased runoff and silt loads reduce
water quality, harm wetlands and can even change the course of rivers.

Section 3.2.c: Africa’s Population
Africa’s population is very unevenly distributed and is, more often than not,
concentrated in places particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The
majority of Africa’s population and its greatest densities can be found along the
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continent’s coastlines and major river deltas like the Niger and Nile; this is especially true
in West Africa. There, 40% of the total population lives within one-kilometer of the
coast88. Twelve African cities (including eight out of the twenty most populous cities on
the continent) are considered to be at risk from sea level rise, storms, and coastal erosion,
even as their populations continue to soar.89 By 2015, Africa is projected to have three
coastal cities of at least 8 million people90 as much of the continent’s future population
growth is expected to occur in West and East Africa where coastal concentrations are
already great91. But exposure to coastal impacts is not the only vulnerability. Roughly 1/3
of Africa’s population lives in drought prone regions.92 Ethiopia, for example, is the third
largest country in Africa, and the majority of its population lives in the western half of
the country that is already prone to drought and crop failure93—and is not expected to
improve in the future. African countries also host a large number of forcibly displaced
persons, some 15 million in 2004. The majority of these people are internally displaced
within their country of origin while 3.5 million now live in other countries.94 Displaced
persons often lack the resources and social support networks of established people, even
the very poor. This renders them particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.
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Section 3.3: A Climate Change Forecast for Africa

Figure 3.3.a

Source: International futures (IFs) base case version 6.41

Figure 3.3.b

Source: International futures (IFs) base case version 6.41

The most recent climate change forecasts for Africa paint a rather grim future in
terms of increasing food and water security as temperatures and sea levels continue to
rise, and as precipitation patterns and intensities continue to shift. Much of the fine-grain
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detail of these changes remain uncertain—the exact amount of change and the exact
distribution of future climatic changes—today’s crop of general circulation models allow
for a ‘broad brush’ forecast of climatic change for the continent and its regions over the
rest of this century.
Africa on the whole, going forward, is likely to see current warming trends
continue and grow even more pronounced over all seasons and across all regions of the
continent, though the extent of this warming will likely not be uniform.95 The subtropical
regions of Africa’s north and south will likely warm the most, by as much as 4°C under
standard emissions scenarios, some 1.5 times greater warming than forecast for the global
average,96 while the continent’s tropical regions, eastern Africa, and most coastal regions
may ‘only’ warm by 2-3°C by the end of the century.97 Most of the continent will also
see a decrease in overall precipitation, with northern Africa, from the Mediterranean
coast to the northern Sahara, and southern Africa beyond the Sahel both seeing a
substantial decrease in precipitation by as much as 15-20%.98 East Africa, on the other
hand, may actually see a substantial increase in overall rainfall. The extent of temperature
and precipitation changes in the Sahel region remains the most uncertain, with some
models showing major decreases in precipitation and others major increases. The region
will grow warmer, but by how much is also uncertain. Sea levels will rise around the
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continent’s coasts by at least one-half meter99 inundating low-lying areas and sending
saltwater intruding into groundwater. Floods and droughts will become more common
and more severe across much of Africa. Such broad-brush changes are interesting, but
mean little without a more detailed look at their impact on Africa’s people and
environments.
Rising temperatures, besides posing a direct threat to human health and security
from heat exhaustion, are likely to worsen food security across the continent. Most crops
currently grown in Africa are already close to the limit of their heat tolerance, and the
livestock, especially cattle, many Africans depend on are also very sensitive to
temperature rises. In many regions, even a few days of extreme heat could result in
reduced crop yields, as well as milk and meat production.100 Warming can also negatively
impact fish catches—a key source of protein for many African communities. Already,
Lake Tanganyika is suffering from a decline in ecological productivity due to
warming.101
Estimates for crop yield loss due to increasing heat range greatly, especially when
the effects of C02 fertilization are factored in: the IPCC estimates that northern Africa
could see an 18% reduction in total crop yields, and southern Africa 22%, this even after
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C02 fertilization is taken into account.102 Other projections suggest some African
countries could suffer crop losses as high as 50% by 2020.103 The wheat fields of
northern Africa and the maize fields of southern Africa are at greatest risk of crop loss,
with some analysts suggesting that in these regions such crops may become impossible to
grow.104 The World Bank estimates that a 2°C rise in global average temperature could
reduce the GDP per capita of most African countries by 4 to 5%, primarily due to
agricultural losses.105
Increasing heat in the climatic system is also altering precipitation patterns and
rainfall intensities across the continent, yielding more frequent extremes of both dry and
wet and a worsening of water security for many. By 2020, forecasted changes in rainfall
may expose some 75 to 250 million Africans to increased long-term water stress, as
northern, southern and parts of western Africa will all likely see moderate to severe
decreases in overall rainfall and surface water flow.106 Rainfall in these regions is likely
to become more erratic, with more intense rainfalls and flooding punctuated by more
intense and extensive droughts. In southern Africa alone, the area prone to water
shortages could increase from 9% today to 29% by 2050.107 For the Sahel and central
regions of Africa, the picture is more uncertain, with most models pointing to a slight
increase in overall rainfall. Eastern Africa, on the other hand, will likely see a moderate
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to extreme increase in rainfall and surface water flow—though as much of this increase
will be concentrated in the wet season, it may lead to significant flooding monsoons that
do little to enhance dry season availability.108 Increasing temperatures will also worsen
the water situation for the 2 million people in Tanzania dependent on melt water from the
mountain glaciers of Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya during the dry season, as the
glaciers are melting rapidly and are forecast to disappear by 2030-2050,109 though some
studies place the date as early as 2020.110 Either way, the glaciers had already lost 33% of
their ice as of 2000.111
More frequent and intense droughts will cause both increased crop and livestock
loss. Past droughts (1980-2000) in Africa have killed an average of 40% of all livestock
in the affected regions (losses ranged from 22-90% of herd).112 Semiarid and arid lands,
already accounting for much of the continent’s surface area, will likely expand 5-8% by
2080 as rain-patterns shift, the African monsoon weakens, and increasing temperatures
drive greater rates of evaporation.113
Insects and disease-causing microbes represent two populations likely to benefit
from climate change as rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns make new
areas more hospitable. The increasing range of insects like the desert locust is likely to
108
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further decrease crop yields in a region where annual crop losses from insect pests is
already in the billions of dollars. Malaria and dengue carrying mosquitoes are moving
into new areas in East Africa like the Kenyan highlands as temperatures and humidity
increase. East and Central Africa are both likely to see increased incidence of both
diseases along with other diarrheal-causing diseases like cholera. By 2030, some 1.15
billion people on the continent will be at risk from malaria, up from 630 million in
2005.114 The incidence of diarrheal diseases could increase by as much as 10% also by
2030.115 In 2000, WHO found such climate-sensitive diseases to be the leading cause of
climate induced death on the continent, and this is likely to remain the case going
forward.116
With much of Africa’s population and agriculture concentrated along the
continent’s coastal regions, rising sea levels will impact both food security and direct
human security as populations are forced to relocate. Saltwater intrusion into currently
fertile river deltas and more intense coastal storms with greater storm surges could
severely damage crop production. By 2050, 17 to 30 percent of Guinea’s rice fields could
be lost to sea level rise—assuming no adaptation. And in Nigeria, some 6,000 square
kilometers of agricultural land and hundreds of oil fields would be inundated by a onemeter rise in sea level.117
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The consequences of the climatic and environmental changes described above
will certainly have a severe impact on Africa’s human societies (see below), but there
remain a number of key uncertainties that, depending on how they resolve, could severely
worsen or help ameliorate this seemingly dire situation: whether the Sahel gets drier or
wetter;118 whether the flow of Africa’s Zambezi and Limpopo decrease by a lot or a little;
whether the Nile’s flow increases or decreases;119 whether the effect of carbon
fertilization is greater than or less than expected; whether the effect on Africa’s
monsoons are greater or less than expected.
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Section 4: From Climate Change to Conflict? Mapping the Potential Pathways
Section 4.1: The Environment-Conflict Connection: does one exist?
Mainstream discourse often depicts the debate over whether changes in the
natural environment can induce conflict in human societies as a largely black-and-white
argument between two diametrically opposed camps: the neo-Malthusians, who argue for
a direct and robust linkage between environmental degradation and conflict, and the
Cornucopians, who argue against any linkage as they believe human ingenuity,
adaptability and market mechanisms will ensure environmental issues are resolved
peacefully—the conflicts that do occur being due to non-environmental factors. While
this depiction of a confrontational argument allows for some drama, it actually presents a
false dichotomy, as the debate is far from black–and-white. Indeed, even a cursory
reading of the recent literature in the field suggests that the two sides are much closer
than is commonly believed;120 and a middle ground between the two is readily apparent.
This section first looks at some of the main arguments for and against an environmentconflict connection and then provides a synthesis of the two camps, which will give us
our rational for pursuing the identification of some possible causal pathways from climate
change to conflict (see below).
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Section 4.1.a: The ‘For’ Camp
Homer-Dixon’s Toronto Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict
research group (TPECAC), was one of the primary ‘pro’ environment-conflict research
groups. They assumed a tight linkage between environmental change (especially those
that resulted in natural resource shortages) and conflict and conducted a number of
qualitative studies to determine if their reasoning was correct. They also examined the
standard Malthusian drivers of population growth and resource distribution issues.
TPECAC identified two potential pathways from environmental change to conflict. In the
first, the over-exploitation/degradation of natural resources force large-scale migrations,
which in turn triggers ethnic strife between the new arrivals and established groups. In
the second, resource scarcity causes economic hardship and undermines state capacity
and legitimacy, which in turn open the way for grievance-based rebellion. Despite their
efforts, the TOECAC group was unable to identify a direct linkage between he
environment and conflict. Instead, they argued that when taken in combination with
political and socioeconomic factors, environmental change and natural resource scarcity
could indeed contribute to the outbreak of violent intrastate conflict.121
Homer-Dixon himself has been placed squarely in the neo-Malthusian camp since
the publication of On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict
in 1991. But his work, both in 1991 and since, seems more to bridge the two camps rather
than to fully subscribe to either. While he does identify causal paths from environmental
change to conflict, Homer-Dixon is quick to point out that the links he describes are
121
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neither necessarily tight nor deterministic; there are numerous intervening factors that
influence whether a society is vulnerable or resilient to the effects of environmental
change. He describes environmental change as playing different causal roles depending
on the political, socioeconomic, and technological intervening factors present.
Historically, the case for the neo-Malthusian viewpoint seems quite strong. Four
factors largely determine the resources available to a given society: the environment in
which the society exists,122 the organization and size of the society,123 the efficiency of
the extractive and processing technologies available to the society,124 and the society’s
interactions with other societies.125 It is clear from archeological records that ancient
societies were very dependent on their environment and were very sensitive to any
changes in it. Indeed, the development of the other three factors stem from this
dependence as societies struggled, first to adapt to environmental change and later to
support a growing population while furthering environmental adaptation. The first
sedentary agricultural systems developed as environmental conditions in some areas
made hunting and gathering impractical while rewarding the growing of crops. The first
major civilizations arose in areas where seasonal flooding and droughts required
organized responses to build waterworks and establish calendars and long term planning.
The records also contain many instances where societies were either unable or unwilling
to adapt to natural changes and or to curtail their own impact on their environments: the
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Mayans at the end of their Classical period, Easter Island and other Polynesian island
societies, Sumer, the Anasazi, and so on all seemed to go through violent collapses which
saw the breakup of empires and even the rise of cannibalism. The question is whether
today’s environmental issues, from general environmental degradation to climate change,
pose a similar threat to modern societies. For those in the ‘for’ camp, the answer to this
question is clearly yes.

Section 4.1.b: The ‘Against’ Camp
The International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), headed by Gleditsch, has
been one of the primary ‘anti’ environment-conflict groups in that they provided many
critiques of Homer-Dixon’s group and neo-Malthusian thought in general. The PRIO
group also belonged to the Collier school of resource-based conflicts, arguing that
resource abundance and not scarcity was a primary cause of conflict. They conducted
quantitative studies designed to look cases where conflicts did occur and where in similar
circumstances they did not. The PRIO, like the TPECAC found no evidence of a direct
connection and that while environmental issues may indeed increase the risk of conflict,
they are a minor part of the constellation of factors that go into generating conflict.126
Buharg et al identify an interesting paradox: how can there be a strong linkage
between climate change and conflict when most of the environmental processes
associated with climate change have truly only begun to appear over the last few decades,

126

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen
(Germany), Climate Change as a Security Risk.
55	
  
	
  

a period coinciding with a dramatic decline in the frequency and severity of conflicts.127
They also chastise the majority of researchers who they feel ignore this paradox. This
paradox can potentially be explained in two ways. First, most of the climate processes
currently underway are still in their ‘infancy’ so to speak, with most of the changes still
to come, and, with the possibility for accelerating or non-linear change in the future, it
seems a mistake to conclude that there is no correlation just because it hasn’t been
apparent over these last two decades. Any correlation could easily be masked by the
massive geopolitical shifts that accompanied the end of the Cold War (which saw peak in
the number of conflicts before falling steadily over the next decade). The other
explanation for Buharg’s paradox is that it may not be looking at the right conflicts.
While the total number of all conflicts around the world has decreased, the number of
non-state conflicts in Africa, for example remained steady after the end of the Cold War,
then hit its highest levels in 1998-2000 and peaked again in 2007. And since the latest
climate change studies show Africa to be warming faster than any other non-polar region,
the two trends do seem to coincide—this doesn’t prove causation by any measure, but it
does suggest the possibility.
Brown and McLeman warn against the sort of neo-Malthusian logic that often
creeps in when environment-conflict researchers analyze conflicts in Africa. As they
rightly point out, the region of the Sahel containing Darfur has been subject to a number
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of intense droughts while the outbreak of conflict remains rare.128 They argue that the
Sudanese government and its support of the Janjaweed militia is to blame for the current
Darfur conflict and not desertification. They also suggest that the environment-conflict
connection is overly deterministic, as, in many parts of Africa, traditional, local
institutions exist to settle any resource scarcity disputes before they become violent—
though as we will see in Section 5, such institutions are not always successful.
Salehyan doesn’t reject the notion that environmental degradation or climate
change poses a threat to human societies, rather he too questions the ‘for’ camp about its
over-reliance on environmental determinism. He argues that the effects of climate change
‘boil down’ to competition over scarce resources and potential loss of livelihoods, and
that there are many ways for societies to manage these problems without resulting to
violence.129 The structural approach to climate conflict linkages often discounts or
ignores the factors of human agency, technological innovation, and the role government
plays in redistributing and managing resources, and in providing conflict mediation.
Thus, any conflict that results is due to failure of the political process and not resource
scarcity. The core of this argument is the theory of the rational actor: the assumption is
that violence is a poor response to resource scarcity since it will ‘often do nothing to
correct the ecological issue and may damage the environment further;’ other adaptive
measures whether migrating or adopting new farming techniques are less costly and less
hazardous to one’s health. This leads to Salehyan’s conclusion that ‘environmental
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processes, by themselves cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur;’
instead, you need the same ‘intervening variables’ that Homer-Dixon suggested were
necessary. To Salehyan, state capacity is the single most important of these variables, and
is the one likely to forestall the outbreak of widespread conflict. He tends to dismiss the
claims that climate change might overwhelm a state’s capacity to cope with the changes
as speculative since ‘such effects either have not materialized or have not been
adequately researched.’ Corruption and cronyism and predatory state behavior are the
greater problems facing developing countries.130

Section 4.1.c: Empirical Findings
Raleigh and Urdal constructed a statistical model designed to test whether
environmental and or demographic stressors can increase the likelihood of a conflict
occurring in a given country. To build their model, they gathered data on conflicts around
the world that occurred during the 1990-2003 period. The authors then selected a set of
four independent variables of conflict to test in their model: water scarcity, land
degradation, population growth, and population density. The results of running the model
showed that while the four variables do increase the likelihood of conflict occurring, the
increase is negligible unless other important exogenous factors are present, namely, state
weakness, low GDP per capita, poor or negative economic growth, and an over
dependence on export commodities, i.e. the standard drivers of conflict. The presence of
environmental or demographic stressors therefore serves to aggravate a situation where
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conflict may already be likely. Of the four identified stressors, land degradation and
population density were found to have the strongest correlation, with land degradation
enhancing the probability of territorial conflicts, like peasant uprisings or ethnic strife,
and with population density increasing the prospect for civil war. And when coupled with
water scarcity, population density was found to increase the risk of all forms of conflict.
The rate of population growth, on its own, seemed to have effect. Raleigh and Urdal’s
main conclusion is that the extent of environmental and demographic stress depends
largely on the actions, or lack of actions, a state takes to address the problems it faces;
those states that lack the capacity to address these factors will therefore face a greater risk
of domestic upheaval.131
Others, like Zhang et al had similar findings: changes in a region’s average annual
temperatures tend to correlate with both declines in agricultural productivity and the
frequency of conflict. And in a study of 41 African countries from 1981-1999, Migel et
al. found evidence that declines in annual rainfall ‘substantially reduces national income
growth and thereby indirectly increases the probability of intrastate conflict.
But Buharg et al, Barnett, and Theisen all found the opposite: their own quantitative
studies all failed to show any correlation between environmentally driven resource
scarcities and conflict, and no evidence that climate change (to date) has had a
detrimental economic impact on any country.
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There is common agreement that there are links, if vague, between environmental change
and violent conflict, however it has not been shown that environmental factors are the
only or even important factors leading to conflict.132
Despite many claims by high-ranking policy-makers and some scientists—the existing
empirical literature has so far not been able to identify systematic, causal relationships of
this kind.133
Rather I argue that the concept of environmentally induced conflict is itself
fundamentally flawed, as it neither allows for convincing empirical substantiation nor for
sound theory building. A critical review of the literature reveals the shakiness of the
concept’s core assumption: the idea that “environmental concerns are indeed associated
with greater conflict.134
Section 4.1.d: Bringing the Two Camps Together
There are several problems with many of these studies and their conclusions.
First, they concentrate on certain types of conflicts, favoring civil wars--where an
organized and armed rebel group challenges a national government—and other largescale conflicts, while ignoring the possibility for low-level conflicts fought between nonstate actors; even as Section 5’s case studies suggest such low-level conflicts represent
the majority of environment-related conflicts. Indeed, Theisin, writing for the
International Peace Research Institute (which tends to belong to the ‘anti’ camp) remarks
on the need for researchers to focus more on local, less intense conflicts. Another
problem, especially for quantitative studies, is that most studies do not address the
possibility of tipping points, thresholds and other sudden environmental shocks or
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ecosystem collapse; they instead favor an environment that undergoes gradual change.
Admittedly, such black swans are inherently difficult to model or predict, but the
possibility ought to be included—you see this in some studies where researchers compare
the different effects of gradual and rapid changes, using changes in annual rainfall as a
measure of rapid change and temperature increase as a gradual change.
Establishing clear, firm, and direct relationships between environmental change
(or climate change for that matter) and violent conflict has proved notoriously difficult.
Study after study—well beyond those described above--have either found tantalizing
evidence but no smoking gun, no evidence at all for a direct connection, or contradictory
evidence. What are we to make of this? Because of this inability to establish a direct
linkage, many researchers have begun to look at more indirect mechanisms by which
environmental change might drive conflict. And it is here where the two sides of the
debate come together, and where certain ‘reasonable’ causal pathways begin to be
elicited.
Section 2 of this paper looked at the existing literature on what are considered to
be the ‘standard’ drivers of conflict. The rest of this section seeks to map out how the
effects of climate change might interact with the conflict drivers of section 2 in ways as
to increase the likelihood of conflict. This section makes the case for four possible
pathways from environmental change to conflict: the resource scarcity pathway, the
economic pathway, the weak state pathway, and the migration pathway. Of course, like
the standard drivers of conflicts before, these pathways are interconnected and
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overlapping. Thus the final part of this section attempts to synthesize these pathways into
a more comprehensive picture of climate change’s potential impact on societal stability.

Section 4.2: Climate Change: The Threat Multiplier?
Most quantitative and or empirical studies of climate change and conflict have
yielded either inconclusive or contradictory results (with some forms of environmental
degradation and change driving conflict and others dampening it). This has led many
researchers to conclude that, should any links exist, those links are most likely indirect
and minor, playing second fiddle to more established conflict factors (economics,
sociopolitical factors, etc). Instead, the ‘standard’ characteristics of societies and systems
that generate favorable conditions for intrastate conflict remain most important,
determining whether or not environmental change becomes a factor. This has resulted in
two common viewpoints: the first sees the inclusion of climate change in causes of
conflict analysis as unnecessary as the same conditions that make a society vulnerable to
climate change also make it vulnerable to conflict. The second viewpoint sees climate
change acting as a threat multiplier rather than an outright source of conflict. As a threat
multiplier, climate change is seen to play on a society’s existing weaknesses, pushing the
state closer to conflict and or collapse; thus, climate change is an important part of the
conflict equation and must be included in conflict models in order to better understand
future conflict occurrences. A threat multiplier increases the severity of existing threats—
but by what mechanism(s)? Are certain threats to stability more likely to be multiplied
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than others? The climate-conflict pathways proposed in this section are an attempt to
answer these two questions.

Section 4.3: Climate-Conflict Pathways
Section 4.3.a: The Resource Scarcity Pathway
Scarcity based conflicts—whether over dwindling food stores, disappearing water
sources, or a dearth of arable land—are the sort of Malthusian-based climate change
scenarios that have come to occupy popular imagination: the hungry huddled masses
streaming out of drought-stricken areas in search of food and water and willing to fight
and even kill to secure them, and ready to overrun the Developed world. But how
realistic is such a scenario? Can resource scarcities be a source of conflict? As mentioned
in the introduction to this chapter, there is little consensus on the answer, with some
scholars finding that resource scarcity has been and will continue to be an important
driver of conflict, while others question whether environmental factors of any kind can
play a role at all.
Recent history (2007-2011) provides a number of examples of, if not outright
scarcity driven conflict, scarcity driven political instability. From late 2007 to mid 2008,
a surge in food prices touched off a series of riots in a number of developing countries
and even one developed country. A combination of environmental and human factors—
droughts and floods hitting several major crop-growing regions, the diverting of large
amounts of corn for use in ethanol production in the US, the climbing price of oil, and
shrinking stores of grain in many countries–all drove food prices to record highs. In less
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than a year, the price of rice on the world market increased by 75% and wheat by 120%.
In Haiti, the high food prices led to a week of violent protests and riots that brought down
the Haitian government as protestors clashed with Haitian police and even UN
Peacekeepers. The unrest resulted in five deaths, the torching of cars, and the looting of
businesses. Similar protests occurred in Egypt, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco,
Mozambique, Tunisia, and Yemen.135
More recently, in September 2010, rioting broke out in Mozambique (again) after
high wheat prices forced the government to raise the price of bread by 30%. The rioting
lasted for days and left 10 people dead and at least 300 wounded.136 Also in 2010, Niger
experienced the worst food crisis in its history (according to the UN). Then, in late 2010
to early 2011, droughts in China, Russia, and Argentina, and massive flooding in
Australia caused world food prices to reach new record highs (the price of wheat rose
from US$4 a bushel in July 2010 to US$9 in February 2011).137 The high food prices also
appear to have played a part in the series of revolts now dubbed the Arab Spring that took
place in the Middle East and North Africa during the period—with several still active—
that led to the deposing of leaders (Tunisia and Egypt), and civil war (Libya and Yemen),
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with Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen all seeing food riots before the larger scale
antigovernment movements.138
Of course, it is important to note that these food shortages and high food prices
were not due solely to environmental factors. Political, economic, and social factors all
played major roles in food shortages and in resource scarcities more generally. HomerDixon, in his seminal work on resource scarcity and conflict, describes three types of
resource scarcity: environmental or supply based scarcity, demand-based scarcity (due to
both population growth and increasing incomes driving up demand for resources), and
structural-based scarcity (the unequal distribution of resources due to existing political,
social, and economic systems). Homer-Dixon also suggests that resource scarcity, to a
certain degree, can be subjective; once you get beyond the bare minimum amount of food
or water required to survive, resource scarcity can be determined by beliefs, preferences,
and norms as well as absolute scarcities.139 And food scarcity does not appear to be
enough to cause conflict in and of itself. In most cases, the riots are settled by
government action without turning into full-blown conflicts, usually by increasing food
subsidies, garnering more food imports, etc. But states that lack the capacity to correct
such shortages may see food riots turn into anti-government conflicts. By failing to
address the high price of food in a timely manner or by seeking to end food riots by force,
states can endanger their legitimacy, increasing the likelihood of conflict. The Egyptian
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government’s response to the 2008 food riots has been cited as one of the main
grievances that touched off the 2010-2011 revolution.140
The role of water scarcity in conflict, in general, has been a controversial one,
with many analysts noting that there have been very few water based wars in history, and
that, more likely than not, water issues between countries are settled through peaceful
agreement. But the same cannot be said for intrastate conflict; as Africa provides a
number of instances where water scarcity and issues over water access have indeed
driven some conflicts, though these have remained mostly small scale. There are two
main forms of ‘water conflict’ in Africa: violent confrontations between nomadic herders
and sedentary farmers of different tribal affiliations over access to watering holes, and
competition between rural and urban populations for access to the same water source.
Environmental degradation and resource scarcity has been a major driving factor in the
genocide in Darfur. Increasing desertification in the region (primarily due to over
grazing) and water scarcity due to drought forced pastoralists and farmers to coexist on
smaller areas of land. In the past, the farmers allowed the pastoralists to move their herds
through their lands and even allowed the herders use of their wells. As the water scarcity
worsened, the pastoralists used the migration adaptive strategy and moved onto lands
occupied by the farmers, and the farmers in turn began fencing off their lands. Thus land
and water shortages and changes in climate helped to exacerbate already existing
religious and ethnic tensions and led to the outbreak of violence in the region.141
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Given that much hinges on the standard drivers of conflict (section 2), and
demand and structural based scarcities, what role does this leave for environmental
factors like scarcity and degradation? Hauge and Ellingsen find that the states affected by
environmental degradation (especially deforestation, land degradation and water scarcity)
are more likely to experience intrastate conflict overall, with land degradation being the
single most aggravating factor. Interestingly, the type of environmental degradation
seems to have an effect on the type of conflict, with deforestation being a significant
driver for small-scale conflicts but not larger conflicts like civil war. Land degradation
and water scarcity are both significant when it comes to general armed conflict but again
are not significant when it comes to civil war. Despite this, Hauge and Ellingsen still find
the standard drivers more important than environmental drivers. However, they do find
the risk of conflict to be the highest when the state is suffering from all three scarcities at
once.142
One of the main arguments against environmental scarcity driven conflict is that
issues like land degradation and deforestation are slow moving changes and thus allow
plenty of time for people to adapt.143 We will look at this issue in more detail in Section
4.3.c on the different effects of rapid and gradual change, but it is important to keep in
mind here.
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Section 4.3.b: The Economic Pathway
Just as economic drivers are considered the most important and most
straightforward of conflict drivers, so too is the economic pathway from climate change
to conflict. In Section 2.2.b we saw how negative factors like poor growth, recessions and
general economic underdevelopment can lead to conflict by decreasing both national and
personal income, by restricting peaceful options for making a living, and by undercutting
the state’s ability to maintain expected public services as state revenues decline. We also
saw that economies overly dependent on agricultural production tend to be more
vulnerable to fluctuations in the global economy, with political instability often
accompanying price extremes, both declines in price and surges in price (the former
affecting farmers and rural workers, the latter affecting urban populations). All this
highlights the importance of economic stability and growth in maintaining a peaceful
society—it also highlights the fact that anything that disrupts such stability could trigger
political instability in those societies unable to absorb or quickly correct the economic
damage. The question is whether the effects of climate change can cause the sort of
economic havoc that might then lead to instability.
The Stern Review is one of the most comprehensive reports on climate change’s
potential economic impacts (and well regarded, though it is not without some
controversy). And while its focus is primarily on developed countries, it seems
reasonable to expect that any economic toll for such countries would be even greater for
developing countries given their lower capacity for adaptive measures. Stern estimates
that extreme weather events alone could cost as much as .5 to 1% of world GDP by 2050,
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with subsequent increases as temperatures continue to climb.144 Watkis estimates that for
Africa, the cost may be as high as 1.5 to 3% of the continent’s total GDP by 2030.145 The
main consequences of climate change, changing temperature and precipitation patterns
and extreme weather events and sea level rise will all likely inflict heavy economic tolls
on affected countries, Developing and Developed, and are already doing so in many areas
of the world.
Recent storm and flood related damage have cost developed countries billions of
dollars in infrastructure damage as well as lives lost. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 cost the
US US$125 billion dollars or 1.2% of its GDP and killed 1300 people.146 The 2003 heat
wave in Europe cost the region’s agricultural sector some US$15 billion dollars and
killed upwards of 35,000 people147. If developed countries can be so affected, what about
developing countries? The record 2010 flood in Pakistan submerged 1/5th of the entire
country and likely cost the country from 25 to 40 billion dollars, including a loss of 2.8
billion from the agricultural sector alone.148 And these costs are only from infrastructure
damage and crop loss, and do not yet account for the displacement of an estimated 18
million people.149 Overall, such disasters are estimated to cost the developing world

144

N Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge UK; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chap. 5, page 1.
145
Paul Watkis, “Economics of Climate Change: Key Messages” (presented at the
Financing for Development, Conference on Climate Change, Kigali, 2009).
146
Stern, The Economics of Climate Change.
147
Ibid.
148
BBC, Pakistan Floods: damage and challenges. 26 August 2010.
149
BBC, Pakistan Floods Still Claiming Lives Six Months on. 28 January 2011.
69	
  
	
  

US$100 billion dollars a year (annual average from 1980 to 2004), and 95% of all deaths
due to weather related disasters from 1980 to 2004 occurred in the developing world.150
Climatic changes like changing precipitation patterns and rising temperatures will
also have a major impact on crop yields, above and beyond direct destruction by extreme
events. In some parts of the world, like the Developed North (especially Canada and
Russia), climate change might actually boost crop yields as heretofore non-arable land
thaws. Carbon dioxide fertilization may also help increase yields in such countries,
though the amount of benefit remains uncertain. But for most of the world, and especially
for Africa, climate change is expected to have a major negative impact on crop yields
(see Section 3.xxx), and the increase in already warm temperatures will likely counteract
any gains from carbon fertilization. For countries that are largely dependent on their
agricultural sector for food, employment, and economic growth, any decline in crop
yields could quickly translate into a decline in state GDP and an increase in
unemployment, poverty, and ultimately hunger—all of which, according to many
scholars of the standard causes of conflict can become conflict drivers through the
creation of grievances, horizontal inequalities, and loss of state legitimacy. It is possible
that any shortfall in food crops due to climate change may be made up via international
trade, but for those countries already struggling to both produce enough food and to
distribute it equitably, and for those countries whose main source of income is precisely
what is affected, trade will likely not make up for declining yields.
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Changes in Agricultural Yields from Climate Change, by region

Figure 4.3.b

Source: International futures (IFs) base case version 6.41

Thus, climate change, through a reduction in crop yields and through damage
caused by extreme weather events and through damage and relocation efforts from rising
sea levels do seem to have a real economic impact, and will likely have an increasingly
grave impact on states around the world as this century progresses. Increasing economic
damage will sap a state’s ability to deal with the current crisis at hand and leave it less
able to undertake further adaptive measures in the future as conditions worsen. And as
the section on resource scarcity (above) suggests, when a state is unable or unwilling to
correct the scarcity, or in this case to provide adequate recovery measures, to subsidize
food after a massive crop loss and retraining and or relocation for those who’ve lost their
livelihoods and homes, it risks losing legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Pakistan’s 2010
flood provides a clear example of this as the prime minister continued his tour of Western
countries as the disaster unfolded and as militant groups proved more effective than the
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government in delivering aid, increasing public anger towards the government and
enhancing the public’s view of the militant groups.151
The mitigative and adaptive measures undertaken by a state can themselves be a
source of economic hardship, straining a state’s resources, perhaps opening the way to
conflict as potential rebel groups see the state ‘in over its head’. Coastal countries, for
example, may have to construct mega-defenses or mega-relocations of fast growing cities
and highly populated and agriculturally productive river deltas as sea levels rise.152 This
would be enormously expensive. Of course, already fragile states may not have the
required resources to undertake adaptive actions in the first place, leave

4.3.c: The Weak State Pathway
When it comes to climate change and conflict, state capacity, or strength, is an important
intervening variable. A strong state with effective institutions can dampen the blow from
resource scarcity and other environmental damage by providing relief and correcting
structural scarcities. A strong state can also better bring in outside aid and take up
adaptive and mitigative efforts prior to disaster striking. These are some of the primary
reasons why [developed countries tend to be more resilient to extreme weather events and
the like than developing countries. In weak or fragile states, weak institutions and or
corrupt practices result in an unfair distribution of resources and are unable to adequate
compensate their people for lost resources; such failures can lead to growing grievances
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against the state and those elites seen to be hording resources for their own benefit.153
Such grievances can combine with already existing ones and tip the balance toward
conflict.
Environmental degradation can increase resource scarcity as traditional resource
sources like fish stocks, forests, and fertile soil, decline. The impacts of climate change,
in particular, can further stress an already fragile state by worsening environmental
degradation, increasing pressure on all levels of society and could worsen socioeconomic and political tensions particularly in societies dependent on natural resources
Barnett argues that environmental change can undermine a state’s legitimacy in the eyes
of its people when it is unable to correct or prevent damage done to economic
livelihoods, human health, food and water security. And whether or not a state is able to
prevent such impacts, the state’s own resources, capacity and even military strength may
be lessened, providing an opportunity for insurgents. An extra drain on resources also
means less money going to other needy areas.154
Bernauer, meanwhile suggests that whether climate change leads to conflict
hinges on the ability of the state to settle or moderate grievances before they lead to
outright conflict, and that democracy in particular is an important intervening variable, as
democratic systems are better able to avoid violence during economic downturns. He
posits that climate change, by reducing a country’s rate of economic growth, can reduce
the amount of resources available to the government both to correct climate-related
153
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damages and to maintain general stability, thus weakening its capacity to provide for its
people. Loss of legitimacy would follow quickly.155

4.3.d: The Migration Pathway
As we saw in Section 2.2.a, migration can be a source of conflict when it disrupts
an established ‘balance of power’ between ethnic and religious groups within sending and
receiving populations. We also saw that people migrate based on a wide variety of pushpull factors. The question is whether climate change will lead to an increase in the
number of migrants, and or generate large numbers of internally displaced peoples. Thus,
the migration pathway form climate change to conflict would work through migratory
patterns and the demographic dynamics of sending and receiving states.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) organizes the effects of
climate change into two sets of migration drivers: climate processes, where long-term
changes in a region’s environment changes people’s incentives (through income loss, loss
of housing, increased scarcity, etc) to remain in a particular location.156 Climate events on
the other hand, are sudden cataclysmic events like floods, glacial lake outbursts, and
hurricanes that can displace large numbers of people in a hurry. Clearly, if people’s
homes are destroyed and fields washed away, they may seek new livelihoods elsewhere.
A person’s ability to migrate depends on his level of mobility, which is a function of his
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or her resources on hand, along with other forms of social and financial capital.157 Of
course, this only applies to migration and not forced dislocation.
Whether people choose to leave their homes or are driven from them, they tend to
follow one of the four main types of migratory movement: international migration,
internal displacement, rural to urban migration and temporary migration. International
migration is what most people think of when it comes to migration. In terms of
environmental and climate migration, the crossing of international borders is rather rare,
despite the common conception of hordes of poor people moving to developed
countries.158 Those that do cross international borders tend to follow preexisting routes,
especially to those places where they have familial and social ties.
A vast majority of those uprooted by environmental and climactic changes move
within their country of origin. Instead of going abroad, they become internally displaced
and either end up in the country’s central cities or in refugee camps. When long-term
changes like droughts set in, rural to urban movement becomes a commonplace response.
When those who subsist on local agriculture for their livelihood can no longer make a
living, they tend to head to the nearest urban center, looking for jobs. The IOM outlines
four major consequences of such forced migration. First, rural to urban population
movements due to increasing food and water security will put increased pressure on
existing urban infrastructures and services which in many cities of the developing world
are already severely strained. The second major consequence is that economic and brain
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drains will occur in the countries of origin further weakening the potential for future
economic growth across the developing world. Third, the influx of large numbers of
environmental refugees to new areas will result in increased ethnic tensions as different
groups once separate mix and as the newcomers begin to compete with those already
established for limited and in many cases decreasing resources. The fourth major
consequence has to do with human health and welfare. In general, as populations move,
disease goes with them. But massive numbers of environmental refugees displaced in
camps or crammed into urban slums represent a particular threat of increased disease
activity as poor sanitary conditions combine with the difficulty of providing vaccinations
and medical treatment to the displaced.

4.3.e: Rapid versus Gradual Change
Adaption takes time. With slow moving climatic changes, a society has time to
adapt to the changing climate without becoming unduly stressed; it can build elaborate
waterworks and levees, relocate cities, develop new crops and farming methods designed
for a warmer/drier climate. Successful adaptation to climate change would limit or even
negate the potential of climate change to drive conflict, as peaceful options would still be
readily available to those groups who might otherwise turn to violence. This is one of the
central arguments of climate-conflict skeptics (and Cornucopians), that humans are
creative and flexible creatures, and that climate-conflict supporters tend to adopt a stance
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of environmental determinism.159 And for the most part, the climate conflict skeptics
would seem to be correct, as, barring non-linear or abrupt climate change scenarios, the
increasing temperatures, rising sea levels, shifting precipitation patterns, and
desertification that are the hallmarks of climate change are all slow moving phenomena
giving people time to undertake adoptive measures. But climate change also includes
rapid phenomena: more extreme storms and floods, and short-term extreme heat waves
and droughts. A fast moving natural disaster like a hurricane allows for quick evacuations
and sandbagging but not long term adaptive measures. Thus, it would stand to reason that
a natural disaster would be more likely to drive conflict than a 1°C increase in average
temperatures over a decade or more. And what we can see is that the impact of natural
disasters fit quite nicely into the four pathways to conflict described above.
Natural disasters like hurricanes and floods can inflict major economic damage to
a state, as infrastructure is destroyed, lives are lost, productivity in the region grinds to a
halt, and money is redirected to support rebuilding efforts. Depending on the size of the
disaster, a state can see an overall decline in GDP—which fits with the economic
pathway from climate change to conflict. Brancatti makes a similar economic causal
argument in his study on the effect of earthquakes on intra and interstate conflict. He
found that because of their rapid onset and lack of warning, earthquakes were more likely
to lead to conflict by causing affected groups to undergo a direct and dramatic increase in
159
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relative deprivation (thus stoking anger and resentment). He suggests that other similarly
rapid natural disasters might have the same effect.160 Hendrix and Glassier also argue that
because short term or rapid onset climatic changes will likely lead to immediate
reductions in income, people will be less able to take adaptive measures.161
Natural disasters can also undermine a state’s ability to maintain security in the
affected region, as was seen in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, and in Pakistan after the
2010 floods. The destruction of infrastructure and redirection of government funds and
attention is one reason for this, but as Buhaug argues, the humanitarian aid that often
pours into the affected region can provide an easily lootable resource, a la the greed
theory of conflict causes, and the inevitable orphans left in the disaster’s wake can
become ready recruits for militias. Disasters therefore decrease the opportunity cost for
group conflict by weakening the state and providing new resources—the weak state
pathway.
Increased resource scarcity tends to be a standard outcome of most disasters as
crops are destroyed, water sources are polluted and the normal means of goods and
electricity transport and distribution are disrupted. Following a sufficiently large disaster,
the government and international community may be hard-pressed to provide needed
food and water before secondary human tragedies occur. Poor aid response and
slow/uneven aid distribution has often been a source of public grievance against the state
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and or the international community—with unequal distribution being worse than slow but
even distribution. This fits well with the resource scarcity pathway.162
Finally, immediate displacement, resource shortages, economic damages and a
decline in personal security, may result in large-scale population movements over short
periods of time, with people often moving to urban areas already straining to support fast
growing populations. As with climate change itself, the pace of migration can be more
important than absolute numbers, as a flood of post-disaster refugees can quickly
overwhelm the receiving area’s resources, driving new intergroup tensions as established
and displaced groups struggle for resources—the migration pathway.
Thus, while not a pathway to conflict itself, the pace of climate change and the
impact of rapid extreme events may prove a deciding factor between a society or state
being able to cope with and employ adaptive measures to changes in its environment,
thereby staving off conflict, and being overwhelmed to the point where conflict becomes
possible or more likely.
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Section 5: Case Studies, the Climate-Conflict Pathways in Action?
Section 5.1: Farmer-Herder Conflicts
Perhaps the best evidence for a climate-conflict connection comes from the
African Sahel where farmer-herder conflicts have become more frequent and more
widespread over the last century, and especially the last fifty years. According to
Davidheiser and Ofouku, a combination of historical, social, and environmental factors
have come together to disrupt established patterns of interactions and promote the
outbreak of violent conflict. During the colonial period, changes in land tenure systems
brought about the rise of resource intensive cash cropping. The resulting environmental
degradation, coupled with increasing human and livestock populations in the region, the
advent of longer, more severe droughts, and increasing north-south migration have all
increased competition over land and water between the nomadic herders and sedentary
farmers that inhabit the region.163
The changing climate has been particularly important in driving the most recent
conflicts as increasingly arid conditions across the Western Sahel have driven thousands
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of Fulbe and Fulani-Hausa herders out of their traditional lands south into farming lands.
The influx of herders and their flocks have resulted in disputes over watering holes,
migratory routes, dry-season farming, crop destruction, etc, that often become violent and
drag in whole tribal units. Where herders and farmers have traditionally coexisted, such
conflicts are rare, as local institutions exist to curb such conflicts. But areas where the
two populations have just begun to interact do not have such institutions. Farmer-herder
conflicts have now occurred in Nigeria, Cote de’Ivoire, Cameroon, Senegal, Mali,
northern Kenya, and Somalia.
Nigeria is the poster child for the standard drivers of conflict. Its borders enclose a
massive, rapidly growing population riven by ever more entrenched ethnic, religious, and
political divisions, all while being governed by a government unable to moderate or
mediate the ever-increasing number of conflicts spreading across its territory. But for the
purposes of this paper, we shall concentrate on just one of the country’s many conflicts:
the ongoing conflict between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers. Small-scale,
localized violence between herders and farmers have been a common feature of life in
Nigeria’s northeastern states for decades. But in recent years the violence has grown
more pronounced and widespread.164 Since 1999, the northeastern states of Bornu, Yobe,
Taraba, Gombe, Bauchi, Benue, and Nasarawa have all seen violent clashes between the
numerous ethnic groups inhabiting the region, with the herder farmer conflict being the
most common but not the only form of conflict. The conflict between herders and farmers
boils down to disputes over land and access to water resources aggravated by ethnic
164

R. Blench and Dendo Mallam, Natural Resource Conflicts in North-Central Nigeria:
A Handbook and Case Studies (London: Mandaras Publishing, 2004).
81	
  
	
  

differences; the nomadic herders tend to be of the majority Fulani-Hausa Muslim group
while the sedentary farmers tend to be Christian Tivs along with other minority groups.
Central to the conflict are the enclosure of grazing lands by farmers, blocked access to
watering holes, trespassing, and cattle-damaged crops165. Most clashes go unreported,
except when they reach a significant level; in 2001, the Nigerian military went in to
Benue state to stop fighting between Jukuns and Tivs (two sedentary groups) over access
to traditional homeland territory, that led to 200 civilians being killed.166 In 2003,
nomadic herdsman from Chad attacked a rural village in response to violent grazing land
disputes the year before between farmers and herdsman in the area leading to dozens of
deaths.167
According to Obioha, conflicts over land account for more than 50% of all
communal clashes experienced in Nigeria from 1991 to 2005. Land-rights, access and
ownership lie at the heart of the pastoralist-farmer conflict. Obioha found that many tribal
clashes are due to the scramble for arable land and water sources by ‘peasant populations’
as the growing economic divide between wealthy and poor rural dwellers have led to a
shortage of good land. Accelerating desertification in the Sahel region of northern
Nigeria has been a primary push-factor in the movement of Fulani-Hausa herds
southwards into established farmlands, upsetting long-standing customs of fair land use.
Climate change can thus be seen as a direct source of the confrontation between ethnic
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groups in the region.168 Climate change has also helped foster conflict between sedentary
farming communities of different ethnic backgrounds as agriculturally productive land
becomes scarcer. With Nigeria, we can see the Resource Scarcity, and Migration
pathways as being especially prominent, but the Weak State pathway is also present.
In northern Kenya, low-level conflicts between farmers and herders and between
different herding clans have become commonplace over the last fifteen years. As with
other such conflicts, the primary conflict flashpoints are contested watering holes,
grazing land and trampled crops. As drought conditions became the norm ten years ago,
nomadic herders in the north began pushing south, triggering conflicts with the farmers
already inhabiting the south.169
Even though all of these conflicts are considered low-level and would likely pass
under the radar of most quantitative studies of environment-conflict linkages, they are of
major importance to the countries affected, especially economically. Livestock
production in northern Kenya provided some 10% of the country’s GDP in 2001 and
accounts for 90% of all employment in the northern provinces. Overall, Kenya’s
agricultural sector provided 27% of the country’s GDP in 2005. When herders and
farmers fight, livestock and crop yields fall, and so do people’s livelihoods.170
Somalia, of course, has seen high-level conflict for more than a decade now. But
here too, there are herder-farmer conflicts and tribal clashes over land and water, made
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worse by high numbers of internally displaced peoples. Somalia is currently undergoing
the worst drought the region has seen in over 60 years. It is currently sending two
thousand people a day across the border into Northern Kenya. Even without the current
drought, relatively peaceful Puntland has seen frequent clashes between herding and
farming groups over access to crop/grazing land and water sources.171 As in Kenya,
livestock and farmland are incredibly important and worth fighting for, especially when
threatened by drought and population movement.

Section 5.2: More Controversial Conflicts
Rwanda: Pre-genocide Rwanda was very much an agrarian country, despite its densely
populated nature. 95% of the country’s population lived in the countryside and 90% of all
workers in the country were employed in the agricultural sector. The result of such
concentrations in rural areas and agriculture meant that most of the country’s population
relied heavily on renewable resources like arable land and forest for sustenance and
livelihoods.172 Rwanda suffered from declining of soil fertility, watershed degradation,
and deforestation, all of which increased food, water, and land scarcity even as demand
for these resources continued to grow (rising incomes and population growth). Erosion of
farmland in the country was especially bad due to the country’s hilly nature and poor
agricultural practices. Half of all farmlands in Rwanda are located on hillsides, making
them prone to erosion. According to Percival and Homer-Dixon, heavy rainfall events
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would wash away more than eleven tons of soil per hectare per year, sending some 12
million tons of soil into the country’s rivers every year. Outside of the hills, overcultivation was the primary reason for loss of soil fertility.
To make matters worse, several droughts in the 1980s and early 1990s further
reduced water availability in areas already suffering from water scarcity due to the
draining of wetlands and damaging of watersheds.173 The result of these environmental
woes was that agricultural production in Rwanda fell sharply and could no longer keep
pace with the country’s rapid population growth. As crop yields fell, people began to
migrate to cities and as yet undamaged farmland. And as time went on, the Rwandan
state began to lose legitimacy. But the Rwandan Genocide was clearly not entirely due to
environmental stress and resource scarcity. As Percival and Homer-Dixon warn, such an
explanation is too simplistic and ignores the many political, economic, and social factors
that led to the other grievances that would eventually explode into the genocide. Still, it
seems reasonable to argue that environmental scarcities, especially of arable land,
worsened the situation, giving rise to new or strengthening existing grievances among the
affected population.
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Section 6: Building a Climate-Conflict Forecasting Model
A Climate-Conflict Conceptual Diagram

Figure 6.1

Source: Author’s Conception

There are a number of different approaches to building a forecasting model of
conflict: the quantitative econometric approach that relies on the collection of large data
sets and tests for statistical significance of potential conflict drivers; the qualitative
approach that uses expert knowledge and analysis of specific countries and or regions;
and the comparative or structural analysis approach that looks at identifying common
elements and conditions between past conflicts cases or between states currently seen to
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be unstable.174 Each of these approaches has drawbacks and limitations. On the
quantitative end, there is the need for high quality data sets for significant periods of time
along with the problem of having to be overly focused on specific drivers that may miss
necessary nuance and having to rely on statistical significance when correlation may not
mean causation. The qualitative approach suffers from the problem of subjectivity, and
the comparative or structural approach again runs into correlation versus causation
problems as well as being prone to painting with overly broad strokes in the sense that
focusing on commonalities may leave out important differences between cases. As
Goldstone argues, the best solution, it would seem, would be to combine, as much as
possible, the three approaches into a single comprehensive framework. That is the
approach taken here.
In the prior section of this paper, we identified four potential pathways from
climate change to conflict: the resource scarcity pathway, economic pathway, weak state
pathway, and the migration pathway. Each suggests a way in which the impacts of
climate change on human societies might, if not lead directly to, at the least increase the
possibility of violent intrastate conflict occurring. In Section 2, we outlined a number of
widely regarded ‘standard drivers’ of conflict, each of which may play some role in
driving intrastate conflict. Finally, in Section 3, we explored the factors that make Africa
in particular more vulnerable than most regions both to conflict and to climate change.
We also looked at what climate change may hold for Africa in the future. Having now
assembled each piece, we can put together a comprehensive (as comprehensive as
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practical anyways) model of the interconnections of all these pieces, which will in turn
allow us to construct a conceptual framework for forecasting future climate conflicts.

Basic Components: The modular approach to building a conflict forecasting model is in
response to the inevitable complexity that arises when one tries to map out all the
reciprocal connections between the various elements that make up such a model. The best
way to think about the modular approach is to think of each component (a component
covers a category of drivers like demographics, economics, etc) as a module that contains
a number of subcomponents within it. The model is then organized in such a way as to
provide two levels of analysis: components that link to each other and subcomponents
that link to each other. The interconnected modules are then ‘plugged into’ the four
climate-conflict pathways and the conflict framework developed in section 2.xxx.

Section 6.2: The Component Modules
Climate Change Module: the climate change component module includes the factors
that determine its severity, namely the level of global carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gas emissions, the stock of CO2 currently in the atmosphere, the loss of
carbon-sequestrating natural habitats, and carbon uptake and human attempts at
mitigation; it also includes the forward linkages to other modules It is possible to get
quite detailed here, given all that the level of CO2 emissions depends on, the world’s
energy sector, agriculture, etc. So, for the sake of simplicity, we assume a singe carbon
emissions input based on existing emissions scenarios like the IPCC’s A1B1 scenario, or
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the IFs emissions forecasts. The climate change module contains five main
subcomponents that have forward linkages to the rest of the model: the probability of
extreme weather events, changes in precipitation patterns, changes in temperature, sea
level rise, and CO2 fertilization. Also, because African countries generate comparatively
small amounts of C02, we have left out the feedback mechanism from the economic and
agriculture modules that would lead back to climate change, though this may be added in
the future.
The Climate module is directly connected to the Agricultural, Economic, and
Environmental Modules, due to climate change’s impact on crop yields, agriculturally
based livelihoods, storm related economic damage, and land degradation due to
desertification and increased erosion, respectively. The module is also directly connected
to the triggers factor of the conflict model, as extreme weather events may act as sparks,
touching off an already building conflict, and to the Demographic module due to an
increasing burden of communicable disease. The climate module is also indirectly linked,
primarily through its economic and agricultural impacts, to the sociopolitical and
systemic modules, because its effects, prevention and or adaptive measures can drain
state resources, and because it can influence whether a country will seek outside aid
money and or increased food imports respectively.

The Environment Module: the environmental module includes within it the stocks of
arable land, water resources, forestry, and fisheries in each country. The module is
directly linked with climate change, due to the impact a changing climate will have on
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natural ecosystems, as well as the Agricultural, Demographic, and Economic modules,
which represent patterns of land use, the demand for natural resources, as well as a
population’s environmental footprint. It is also directly connected to the resource scarcity
pathway as the health of the environment is one of the major factors determining the level
of natural resources available. The environmental module is also indirectly connected to
state capacity and state legitimacy (of the Sociopolitical Module) as an environment in
decline may not only drain state resources, it may also cost a state legitimacy either by
letting environmental decline continue or by being seen as a direct contributor to the
decline.

The Agricultural Module: this module includes several subcomponents: the amount of
arable land and water used, crop yields, livestock production levels, and irrigation levels.
The Agricultural module is directly linked to the Demographic module, as population
size is a major determinant of food and water demand, as well as the Systemic module, as
the level of a country’s food production is a determinant in how much food the country
imports. It is also directly linked with the Economic module, due to income generation,
and the level of its dependency on agricultural production.

The Demographic Module: includes total population, population density and growth
rate, the rate of urbanization, the population’s age and sex structure, its ethnic and
religious factionalization, and the burden of communicable disease within the population.
The Demographic module is directly connected to the sociopolitical module, as
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population pressures and specifically ethnic competition for state resources may shape
the nature of the state. It is also directly connected to the economic module, as the size of
a country’s working-age population and the ratio of dependents to workers are both
important for determining a country’s economic growth. The Demographic module is
also linked directly to the environmental module, in order to model carrying capacity.
Finally, the module is indirectly connected to the actors factor of the conflict model as the
ethnic and religious make up of the country may reveal which groups are more likely to
take up arms.

The Economic Module: includes a country’s GDP, its GDP per capita, the growth rate
of each, the level of a country’s economic dependence on agricultural production, the
presence of economic discrimination, and the country’s foreign debt level. The Economic
module is a central component of the model, being directly connected to every other
module except for Security—though should a measure of the black market be included,
this would also prompt a direct connection. The linkages between the Economic module
and climate change and environmental degradation will most likely be negative,
weakening a country’s economy depending on the severity of impacts. Demographics, of
course, play an important role in terms of both current consumption levels and the
possibility for future GDP growth. The economic module is also closely linked to the
Agricultural.
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The Systemic Module: includes a country’s openness to trade, whether any of its
neighbors are currently involved in conflict (inter or intra), how involved the country is in
international organizations and treaties, and the amount of food the country imports. The
Systemic module is directly connected to the Sociopolitical module, as a country’s
political system both can determine and be shaped by its involvement on the international
state—with democratic or democratization states tending to be more open than others. It
is also directly connected to the economic pathway as high levels of trade may help
dampen economic losses from local declines in production and can provide an alternate,
peaceful source of income, unless of course, the goods the country trades in are
specifically affected by climate change.

The Sociopolitical Module: includes a country’s regime type, whether the country is in
the process of democratizing and or how far it is in that process, state capacity and state
legitimacy. The module is directly connected to all of the main modules except for
climate change and environment (there are, however, indirect connections which we will
describe in a moment). Sociopolitical factors tend to be mediate the impacts and
interactions of all the other societal modules, as the political system and the political
society tends to shape how the society behaves, from setting reproductive policy, or not,
to negotiating international treaties and maintaining security within the country’s borders.
The Sociopolitical module is also indirectly connected to the Environmental and Climate
Change modules as the state may see its legitimacy decline should it be unable to correct
the environmental issues plaguing its people or should it be seen as having a hand in the
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degradation in the first place. The module is also directly connected to dampeners and
catalyst conflict factors, as the state is a primary player in most conflicts, and can either
act as a dampener by suppressing possible conflict or as a catalyst by making a conflict
worse whether by its own actions or a lack of action.

The Security Development Module: includes the prevalence of small arms in the
country, the country’s level of militarization, its geography, and whether it has a history
of conflict. The module is directly connected to the Sociopolitical and Systemic modules.
The Systemic because many small arms are likely to come from outside the country, and
because whether neighboring states are currently or have recently experienced conflict
will likely affect the country’s level of militarization. The Sociopolitical module because
state capacity and legitimacy both reflect and influence the country’s level of security,
and because the country’s regime type and political structure may affect its ability to
maintain control over its entire territory when conflict promoting terrain like mountains
and jungles are present.

Adding the Pathways: as well as connecting with each other, the modules described
above also fit directly and indirectly into the four climate-conflict pathways. The resource
scarcity pathway is made up from the interactions between the Agricultural Module,
Demographic Module, Economic Module, Environmental Module, Sociopolitical
Module, and Systemic Module. Together, these modules encompass the three types of
scarcities described by Homer-Dixon: environmental/supply based scarcities, demand
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based scarcities, and structural scarcities. The economic pathway is made up from the
interactions of the Economic Module, Sociopolitical Module and Systemic Module. The
migration pathway is made up from the Demographic Module, Economic Module,
Security Module, Security Module and Sociopolitical Module. Together these factors
represent the push-pull factors that drive people to migrate, from population pressure to
physical insecurity. Finally, the weak state pathway consists of Economic, Security and
Sociopolitical factors. The Climate Change and Environmental modules are indirectly
present in each pathway, as their effects are already felt in each individual module.

Tying it all to the Conflict Framework: the four climate-conflict pathways provide the
primary connections between the modules and conflict factors. The resource scarcity,
economic and weak state pathways all act as structural factors, creating the underlying
conditions for conflict. But resource scarcity and economics can also provide motivation
and opportunities for conflict (mobilizing factors). The migration pathway can act as a
number of conflict factors: it can be a mobilizing factor by upsetting current political and
demographic systems, a sudden influx of people into a region can act as a trigger, igniting
existing but latent hostilities between ethnic/religious groups, and it can act as a catalyst,
as refugee camps created by a conflict may give provide recruiting groups for various
groups to continue fighting. Each of the four pathways, of course, can also feed off of and
reinforce each other.
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By using this modular structure, we can see how the impacts of climate change
and environmental degradation ripple through the system, creating conditions more
conducive to conflict occurrence.

Section 7: Conclusions
Whether environmental change, generally, or climate change, in particular, can
cause conflict remains controversial and unproven. But this paper, by raising and
answering five important questions, has been able to show that for vulnerable societies,
environmental factors can indeed increase the potential for violent conflict within states,
but by acting through or in accordance with other conflict promoting factors. In this
conception, climate change becomes a threat multiplier, aggravating existing conflict
drivers and weakening conflict dampeners, making intrastate conflicts more likely.
This paper began by asking five important questions: why do conflicts occur
when and where they do? How might climate change effect vulnerable societies in
Africa? Could these effects lead directly to violent conflict? Or might they instead drive
conflict indirectly? And, finally, once we have established a connection between climate
change and conflict, can we construct a climate-conflict model to serve as a basis for
identifying future conflict hotspots? To answer these questions, we first developed our
own conflict framework containing the various elements that ‘work together’ to generate
conflict and which, through interaction, can cause a conflict to evolve once it is
underway. We then looked at a number of structural drivers, from demographics to
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domestic and international security, that the existing literature has found to influence the
probability of conflict occurrence.
Once we had an understanding of the general factors that go into generating
conflict, it became possible for us to qualitatively identify possible causal pathways by
which the effects of climate change on vulnerable societies might increase the probability
of conflict within those societies. We located these pathways by comparing the ‘standard’
drivers of conflict and the expected impacts of climate change, the pathways occurring
where the drivers and impacts matched. We found four main climate-conflict pathways:
the economic, resource scarcity, weak state, and migration pathway; where the economic
pathway leads from climate change-related damage to agricultural production and
infrastructure to economic downturn/loss of livelihoods, to conflict-causing grievances;
the resource scarcity pathway leads from heightened environmental food and water
scarcity to intergroup competition for resources to conflict; the weak state pathway from
resource drains, direct damages and failure to protect to grievances; and the migration
pathway, which leads from increased hardship and loss of livelihood, to rural to urban
migration, to increased interethnic rivalry. We also found that the exact nature of the
climatic changes, whether they occur gradually or rapidly, can have a great impact on the
causal pathways, with rapid climatic events strengthening the pathway from climate to
conflict and with gradual changes weakening the pathway, as such changes allow time for
societies to adopt nonviolent cooping measures instead of turning to conflict.
Finally, we turned to mapping these four pathways by building a conceptual
model highlighting the linkages between climatic changes, the elements of our conflict
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framework, from structural factors and motivating factors to conflict dynamics like
catalysts and dampeners. The conceptual model nicely illustrates climate change’s role as
threat multiplier, but it is, of course, overly simplistic. The challenge, then, is to figure
out the exact nature and relative strength of each interaction in the model—to quantify
those relationships. The quantification of this paper’s findings represents the next step in
our goal of developing a forecasting model that has the potential to act as an early
warning system, identifying potential conflicts before they occur. This, however, must be
saved for a later paper. 	
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Appendix A.1
Global Conflict Trends by Conflict Type
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(Table 2) as part of a global study. They estimated that about 1.4 million people could be displaced by
present rates of relative sea-level rise from 2000 to 2050< with the vast bulk of these people
(1.3.million) being in the Nile delta. Syvitski et al. (2009) identified the Nile and Niger deltas as being
the most threatened of the African deltas due to subsidence and human interference, with the Limpopo
and Congo deltas being much less threatened.
Table 3: African port city ranking based on population
and B.1
asset exposure under future socio-economic situation
Appendix
and the 2070s climate change (sea-level rise and more intense storms, where appropriate) and natural and
human-induced subsidence (Taken from Nicholls et al., 2008).

African Cities Vulnerable to Sea Level Rise
Population Ranking
Rank

African Port City

Asset Ranking
Exposed
Population
(Thousands)

African Port City

1
2
3

Alexandria, EGYPT
Lagos, NIGERIA
Abidjan, CÖTE D’IVOIRE

4103
3229
3110

4

Lomé, TOGO

858

5
6

496
384
351

Algiers, ALGERIA

143

Casablanca, MOROCCO

9
10
11

Conakry, GUINEA
Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE
Dare-es-Salaam, TANZANIA UNI
REP
Banghazi, LIBYAN ARAB
JAMAHIRIYA
Dakar, SENEGAL
Mogadishu, SOMALIA
Casablanca, MOROCCO

Alexandria, EGYPT
Abidjan, COTE D’IVOIRE
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13332
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Figure B.1
Source: S. Brown, A. S Kebede, and R. J Nicholls, “Sea-Level Rise and Impacts in Africa, 2000 to
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2100,”
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Environment
Institute (2009):

population and economy and strong trends of urbanisation. However, the continent remains poor and
for example rapidly expanding coastal cities have little of any formal flood management. Further,
delta areas such as the Nile are changing rapidly due primarily to human interference. Hence, Africa’s
coast will look quite different in 50 years. Climate change and sea-level rise are additional problems
that could cause significant impacts, especially if there is no preparation for these changes.
The lack of data on Africa’s coast is especially striking and this is a major barrier to better analysis.
Missing data includes information on present rates of sea-level change and coastal geomorphology
through to good data on socio-economic trends. Good coastal environmental management depends on
this type of information, and it should be a priority to improve collection. This suggests a need for
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Appendix B.2
11/04/2011

Map of Vulnerable Cities and Populations

Figure 2: African cities at risk due to sea-level rise (including St. Denis in Reunion) (Taken from UNHABITAT, 2008).

Figure
B.2 et al. (2008) estimated the exposure of the world largest port cities to coastal flooding
Source: Ibid.
Nicholls
due to
storm surge. Using a population criteria of one million people in 2005, they identified 136 port cities
globally, of which 19 are in Africa. They have found that Africa is ranked as the third and fourth
highest continent in terms of port city’s population exposure (more than 2.6 million people in the
coastal floodplain in 2005) and asset exposure (about US$42 billion of assets in the floodplain in
2005), respectively. Given the low wealth and poor development of flood management in Africa, this
existing exposure is of concern. Alexandria (Egypt) and Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire) appear in the top
twenty list of world port cities for high population exposure to coastal flooding in 2005. Taking highend scenarios of socio-economic, climate and non-climate trends, in the 2070s, the total population
and assets exposed in the nineteen cities grows to 13.3 million people and US$998 billion of assets,
respectively (see ranks inTable 3). Three cities contain the bulk of this exposure: Alexandria, Lagos
and Abidjan. In contrast other large port cities have relatively small exposure, such as Cape Town,
Tripoli and Luanda. The study also reveals that from 2005 to the 2070s, smaller cities (in terms of
population and wealth) such as Mogadishu (Somalia) and Luanda (Angola) could experience a rapid
increase in population and asset exposure posing significant challenges for local communities to adapt
to these changes. Given that Africa is urbanising rapidly, other large port cities are likely to emerge
	
   through the 21st century, such as Mombasa, Kenya106	
  
– in 2005 its population was below one million.
Dasgupta et al. (2009) also ranked Egypt, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Benin in the top ten most impacted
countries (out of 84 developing coastal countries considered world-wide) for population potentially
8

Appendix C.1
Climate-Conflict Pathway Model with Drivers

Figure C.1
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